Citation for this page in APA citation style.           Close


Topics

Introduction
Problems
Freedom
Knowledge
Mind
Life
Chance
Quantum
Entanglement
Scandals

Philosophers

Mortimer Adler
Rogers Albritton
Alexander of Aphrodisias
Samuel Alexander
William Alston
Anaximander
G.E.M.Anscombe
Anselm
Louise Antony
Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
David Armstrong
Harald Atmanspacher
Robert Audi
Augustine
J.L.Austin
A.J.Ayer
Alexander Bain
Mark Balaguer
Jeffrey Barrett
William Barrett
William Belsham
Henri Bergson
George Berkeley
Isaiah Berlin
Richard J. Bernstein
Bernard Berofsky
Robert Bishop
Max Black
Susan Blackmore
Susanne Bobzien
Emil du Bois-Reymond
Hilary Bok
Laurence BonJour
George Boole
Émile Boutroux
Daniel Boyd
F.H.Bradley
C.D.Broad
Michael Burke
Jeremy Butterfield
Lawrence Cahoone
C.A.Campbell
Joseph Keim Campbell
Rudolf Carnap
Carneades
Nancy Cartwright
Gregg Caruso
Ernst Cassirer
David Chalmers
Roderick Chisholm
Chrysippus
Cicero
Tom Clark
Randolph Clarke
Samuel Clarke
Anthony Collins
August Compte
Antonella Corradini
Diodorus Cronus
Jonathan Dancy
Donald Davidson
Mario De Caro
Democritus
William Dembski
Brendan Dempsey
Daniel Dennett
Jacques Derrida
René Descartes
Richard Double
Fred Dretske
Curt Ducasse
John Earman
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Epictetus
Epicurus
Austin Farrer
Herbert Feigl
Arthur Fine
John Martin Fischer
Frederic Fitch
Owen Flanagan
Luciano Floridi
Philippa Foot
Alfred Fouilleé
Harry Frankfurt
Richard L. Franklin
Bas van Fraassen
Michael Frede
Gottlob Frege
Peter Geach
Edmund Gettier
Carl Ginet
Alvin Goldman
Gorgias
Nicholas St. John Green
Niels Henrik Gregersen
H.Paul Grice
Ian Hacking
Ishtiyaque Haji
Stuart Hampshire
W.F.R.Hardie
Sam Harris
William Hasker
R.M.Hare
Georg W.F. Hegel
Martin Heidegger
Heraclitus
R.E.Hobart
Thomas Hobbes
David Hodgson
Shadsworth Hodgson
Baron d'Holbach
Ted Honderich
Pamela Huby
David Hume
Ferenc Huoranszki
Frank Jackson
William James
Lord Kames
Robert Kane
Immanuel Kant
Tomis Kapitan
Walter Kaufmann
Jaegwon Kim
William King
Hilary Kornblith
Christine Korsgaard
Saul Kripke
Thomas Kuhn
Andrea Lavazza
James Ladyman
Christoph Lehner
Keith Lehrer
Gottfried Leibniz
Jules Lequyer
Leucippus
Michael Levin
Joseph Levine
George Henry Lewes
C.I.Lewis
David Lewis
Peter Lipton
C. Lloyd Morgan
John Locke
Michael Lockwood
Arthur O. Lovejoy
E. Jonathan Lowe
John R. Lucas
Lucretius
Alasdair MacIntyre
Ruth Barcan Marcus
Tim Maudlin
James Martineau
Nicholas Maxwell
Storrs McCall
Hugh McCann
Colin McGinn
Michael McKenna
Brian McLaughlin
John McTaggart
Paul E. Meehl
Uwe Meixner
Alfred Mele
Trenton Merricks
John Stuart Mill
Dickinson Miller
G.E.Moore
Ernest Nagel
Thomas Nagel
Otto Neurath
Friedrich Nietzsche
John Norton
P.H.Nowell-Smith
Robert Nozick
William of Ockham
Timothy O'Connor
Parmenides
David F. Pears
Charles Sanders Peirce
Derk Pereboom
Gualtiero Piccinini
Steven Pinker
U.T.Place
Plato
Karl Popper
Porphyry
Huw Price
H.A.Prichard
Protagoras
Hilary Putnam
Willard van Orman Quine
Frank Ramsey
Ayn Rand
Michael Rea
Thomas Reid
Charles Renouvier
Nicholas Rescher
C.W.Rietdijk
Richard Rorty
Josiah Royce
Bertrand Russell
Paul Russell
Gilbert Ryle
Jean-Paul Sartre
Kenneth Sayre
T.M.Scanlon
Moritz Schlick
John Duns Scotus
Albert Schweitzer
Arthur Schopenhauer
John Searle
Wilfrid Sellars
David Shiang
Alan Sidelle
Ted Sider
Henry Sidgwick
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Peter Slezak
J.J.C.Smart
Saul Smilansky
Michael Smith
Baruch Spinoza
L. Susan Stebbing
Isabelle Stengers
George F. Stout
Galen Strawson
Peter Strawson
Eleonore Stump
Francisco Suárez
Richard Taylor
Kevin Timpe
Mark Twain
Peter Unger
Peter van Inwagen
Manuel Vargas
John Venn
Kadri Vihvelin
Voltaire
G.H. von Wright
David Foster Wallace
R. Jay Wallace
W.G.Ward
Ted Warfield
Roy Weatherford
C.F. von Weizsäcker
William Whewell
Alfred North Whitehead
David Widerker
David Wiggins
Bernard Williams
Timothy Williamson
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Susan Wolf
Xenophon

Scientists

Emily Adlam
David Albert
Philip W. Anderson
Michael Arbib
Bobby Azarian
Walter Baade
Bernard Baars
Jeffrey Bada
Guido Bacciagaluppi
Leslie Ballentine
Marcello Barbieri
Jacob Barandes
Julian Barbour
Horace Barlow
Gregory Bateson
Jakob Bekenstein
John S. Bell
Mara Beller
Charles Bennett
Ludwig von Bertalanffy
Susan Blackmore
Margaret Boden
David Bohm
Niels Bohr
Ludwig Boltzmann
John Tyler Bonner
Emile Borel
Max Born
Satyendra Nath Bose
Walther Bothe
Jean Bricmont
Hans Briegel
Leon Brillouin
Daniel Brooks
Stephen Brush
Henry Thomas Buckle
S. H. Burbury
Melvin Calvin
William Calvin
Donald Campbell
John O. Campbell
Sadi Carnot
Sean B. Carroll
Anthony Cashmore
Eric Cavalcanti
Eric Chaisson
Gregory Chaitin
Jean-Pierre Changeux
Rudolf Clausius
Arthur Holly Compton
John Conway
Simon Conway-Morris
Peter Corning
George Cowan
Jerry Coyne
John Cramer
Francis Crick
E. P. Culverwell
Antonio Damasio
Olivier Darrigol
Charles Darwin
Paul Davies
Richard Dawkins
Terrence Deacon
Lüder Deecke
Richard Dedekind
Louis de Broglie
Stanislas Dehaene
Max Delbrück
Abraham de Moivre
David Depew
Bernard d'Espagnat
Paul Dirac
Theodosius Dobzhansky
Hans Driesch
John Dupré
John Eccles
Arthur Stanley Eddington
Gerald Edelman
Paul Ehrenfest
Manfred Eigen
Albert Einstein
George F. R. Ellis
Walter Elsasser
Hugh Everett, III
Franz Exner
Richard Feynman
R. A. Fisher
David Foster
Joseph Fourier
George Fox
Philipp Frank
Steven Frautschi
Edward Fredkin
Augustin-Jean Fresnel
Karl Friston
Benjamin Gal-Or
Howard Gardner
Lila Gatlin
Michael Gazzaniga
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen
GianCarlo Ghirardi
J. Willard Gibbs
James J. Gibson
Nicolas Gisin
Paul Glimcher
Thomas Gold
A. O. Gomes
Brian Goodwin
Julian Gough
Joshua Greene
Dirk ter Haar
Jacques Hadamard
Mark Hadley
Ernst Haeckel
Patrick Haggard
J. B. S. Haldane
Stuart Hameroff
Augustin Hamon
Sam Harris
Ralph Hartley
Hyman Hartman
Jeff Hawkins
John-Dylan Haynes
Donald Hebb
Martin Heisenberg
Werner Heisenberg
Hermann von Helmholtz
Grete Hermann
John Herschel
Francis Heylighen
Basil Hiley
Art Hobson
Jesper Hoffmeyer
John Holland
Don Howard
John H. Jackson
Ray Jackendoff
Roman Jakobson
E. T. Jaynes
William Stanley Jevons
Pascual Jordan
Eric Kandel
Ruth E. Kastner
Stuart Kauffman
Martin J. Klein
William R. Klemm
Christof Koch
Simon Kochen
Hans Kornhuber
Stephen Kosslyn
Daniel Koshland
Ladislav Kovàč
Leopold Kronecker
Bernd-Olaf Küppers
Rolf Landauer
Alfred Landé
Pierre-Simon Laplace
Karl Lashley
David Layzer
Joseph LeDoux
Gerald Lettvin
Michael Levin
Gilbert Lewis
Benjamin Libet
David Lindley
Seth Lloyd
Werner Loewenstein
Hendrik Lorentz
Josef Loschmidt
Alfred Lotka
Ernst Mach
Donald MacKay
Henry Margenau
Lynn Margulis
Owen Maroney
David Marr
Humberto Maturana
James Clerk Maxwell
John Maynard Smith
Ernst Mayr
John McCarthy
Barbara McClintock
Warren McCulloch
N. David Mermin
George Miller
Stanley Miller
Ulrich Mohrhoff
Jacques Monod
Vernon Mountcastle
Gerd B. Müller
Markus P. Müller
Emmy Noether
Denis Noble
Donald Norman
Travis Norsen
Howard T. Odum
Alexander Oparin
Abraham Pais
Howard Pattee
Wolfgang Pauli
Massimo Pauri
Wilder Penfield
Roger Penrose
Massimo Pigliucci
Steven Pinker
Colin Pittendrigh
Walter Pitts
Max Planck
Susan Pockett
Henri Poincaré
Michael Polanyi
Daniel Pollen
Ilya Prigogine
Hans Primas
Giulio Prisco
Zenon Pylyshyn
Henry Quastler
Adolphe Quételet
Pasco Rakic
Nicolas Rashevsky
Lord Rayleigh
Frederick Reif
Jürgen Renn
Giacomo Rizzolati
A.A. Roback
Emil Roduner
Juan Roederer
Robert Rosen
Frank Rosenblatt
Jerome Rothstein
David Ruelle
David Rumelhart
Michael Ruse
Stanley Salthe
Robert Sapolsky
Tilman Sauer
Ferdinand de Saussure
Jürgen Schmidhuber
Erwin Schrödinger
Aaron Schurger
Sebastian Seung
Thomas Sebeok
Franco Selleri
Claude Shannon
James A. Shapiro
Charles Sherrington
Abner Shimony
Herbert Simon
Dean Keith Simonton
Edmund Sinnott
B. F. Skinner
Lee Smolin
Ray Solomonoff
Herbert Spencer
Roger Sperry
John Stachel
Kenneth Stanley
Henry Stapp
Ian Stewart
Tom Stonier
Antoine Suarez
Leonard Susskind
Leo Szilard
Max Tegmark
Teilhard de Chardin
Libb Thims
William Thomson (Kelvin)
Richard Tolman
Giulio Tononi
Peter Tse
Alan Turing
Robert Ulanowicz
C. S. Unnikrishnan
Nico van Kampen
Antony Valentini
Francisco Varela
Vlatko Vedral
Vladimir Vernadsky
Clément Vidal
Mikhail Volkenstein
Heinz von Foerster
Richard von Mises
John von Neumann
Jakob von Uexküll
C. H. Waddington
Sara Imari Walker
James D. Watson
John B. Watson
Daniel Wegner
Steven Weinberg
August Weismann
Paul A. Weiss
Herman Weyl
John Wheeler
Jeffrey Wicken
Wilhelm Wien
Norbert Wiener
Eugene Wigner
E. O. Wiley
E. O. Wilson
Günther Witzany
Carl Woese
Stephen Wolfram
H. Dieter Zeh
Semir Zeki
Ernst Zermelo
Wojciech Zurek
Konrad Zuse
Fritz Zwicky

Presentations

ABCD Harvard (ppt) Bhaktivedanta Aug 2026
Biosemiotics
Free Will
Mental Causation
James Symposium
CCS25 Talk
Evo Devo September 12
Evo Devo October 2
Evo Devo Davies Nov12

 
Emily Adlam

Emily Adlam is a professor in the Schmid College of Science and Technology at Chapman University in Irvine, California.

In her 2021 book Foundations of Physics, Adlam has an extensive discussion of nonlocality.

It is a basic fact of our experience that our actions affect only those objects which are spatially co-located with us at the time of the action, and that we can influence more distant objects only by means of some mediating physical process - so. for example. we cannot communicate ideas instantaneously to people on the other side of the world, and are instead forced to take recourse to some mediating physical process such as putting a letter in the post. Further examination of the macroscopic world seems to bear out the conjecture that this constraint applies quite generally across the classical world, and therefore in classical physics it was more or less taken for granted that there could be no action at a distance.

But in the world of quantum mechanics. it seems this simple observation might no longer hold. if we prepare the parts of a composite system independently and then combine them...

the result of such a procedure will be an entangled state. It might be tempting to suppose that entanglement is no more than a quirk of our choice of mathematical representation, but in 1964 John Bell showed that its existence has profound physical consequences.

To do so, BelI studied 'local hidden variable models' - that is, models in which all correlations between measurements on different systems can be traced back to correlations between hidden variables of the systems that were established during a local interaction at some point in their common past.

But there exist entangled quantum systems that violate this inequality, and therefore quantum systems cannot be fully explained by any local hidden variable model...

To appreciate the significance of this result. it is important to distinguish quantum correlations from more familiar sorts of distant correlations. In his essay 'Bertlmann's Socks and the Nature of Reality,' Bell explained this by analogy to socks. Suppose I take a pair of socks from a drawer, separate them without looking at them, and then send one sock to Japan and another to Brazil. My colleagues in Japan and Brazil open their packages at the same time and immediately report their results to me: lo and behold, both socks are red! Of course, there is nothing mysterious about this distant, instantaneous correlation - it occurs because the sock were paired up before being separated, i.e. it can be accounted for in terms of local interactions in the past. But Bell's theorem shows that there exist correlations in quantum mechanics which cannot be explained in this way- no matter how much information is shared between the two quantum systems in the Bell experiment at the time when they are together, it is not possible to achieve the kind of coordinated measurement results exhibited by quantum mechanics using only that shared information. The mathematics seems to be telling us that the choice of measurement on one particle must instantaneously influence the state of the other particle, even if the measurements are made almost simultaneously at very distant locations.

Information philosophy has explored the idea that those "local interactions in their common past" might be a "common cause" of the perfect correlations in the future measurements, based on the fundamental principle of conservation of momentum true in both classical physics and quantum physics.

It is well known that the final spin directions observed by Alice and Bob cannot have been created in the original entanglement, because Alice and Bob can choose to measure at an arbitrary angle and still get perfect correlations. See our web page on a common cause.

In her 2025 book Saving Science from Quantum Mechanics, Adlam suggests that a "useful way to understand the measurement problem is to see it as a problem of epistemology" and that she "will use the term 'measurement' quite generally to refer to any observation or interaction which can be regarded as yielding some kind of empirical knowledge." (p.11).

This is of course our "fundamental question in information philosophy, how does new information (or knowledge) enter the universe, since it began in a state of thermal equilibrium (maximum entropy and minimal information) since it began some 13.7 million years ago?

In the information physics solution to the problem of measurement, the timing and location of the "cut" or "Schnitt" of Heisenberg and von Neumann are identified with the interaction between quantum system and classical apparatus that collapses the wave function and leaves the apparatus in an irreversible stable state providing a record of information "observable" at that moment or any time later.

Von Neumann asked where exactly in the observer's mind or consciousness the "Schnitt" occurs. John Bell called this problem the "shifty split." Here is Bell's drawing. with our indication where the "Schnitt" belongs.

This is Adlam's "observation or interaction which can be regarded as yielding some kind of empirical knowledge."

It's not the observer's brain, mind, or consciousness that's needed to "collapse" a wave function. It's the irreversible interaction of the quantum system with another system. The interaction must be one that changes the information (or knowledge) about the system, so this is indeed Adlam's "empirical knowledge." And that means a local entropy decrease (a negentropy or information increase) and an overall entropy increase to make the information stable enough to be observed then or much later by an experimenter.

This two-stage irreversible temporal process randomly decreases the physical entropy locally (an increase in information), requiring a compensating increase in global entropy (and decrease in information elsewhere) to satisfy the second law of thermodynamics.

This is the deep relationship between immaterial information and material entropy that John Wheeler calls "It from Bit."

Adlam describes the measurement problem in great detail in her 2025 book Saving Science from Quantum Mechanics...

Evidently there is some kind of problem in the vicinity of measurement in quantum mechanics, but it turns out to be quite non-trivial to say exactly what the problem is and what it would take to solve it. The literature contains many different descriptions of the measurement problem - indeed, nearly everyone who works in this area seem to have a lightly different conception of what the problem is! - and naturally these different conceptions of the problem lead to different ideas about what a viable solution looks like.

In this book, I will suggest that one useful way to understand the measurement problem is to see it as a problem of epistemology. This presentation of the problem is a little different from some popular accounts, but I hope to make a care that this epistemic construal of the problem does indeed highlight a serious gap in our understanding of quantum mechanics, and moreover that conceptualising the problem in this way ultimately improves the prospects that it can actually be solved.

Before presenting this epistemic account of the measurement problem, let us start with a simpler question: what is a measurement? In this chapter l will offer a somewhat schematic answer to this question; later, in chapter 4, I will take a more detailed look at what recent work in epistemology has to say about the matter, fleshing out the details of the account I sketch below.

First note that my concern in this discussion is not to demarcate measurements from more general kinds of observations. The term 'measurement' is most commonly associated with scientific experiments performed specially designed laboratories but in a sense every time we open our eyes and look at the world around us or perceive it In some other way, we can be regarded as carrying out a rudimentary 'measurement' - indeed, science presumably has its origins in attempts to systematise the results of these simple kins of measurement. So in this book l will use the term 'measurement' quite generally to refer to any observation or interaction which can be regarded as yielding some kind of empirical knowledge, for example, measurement may include things like looking at the sky, reading a book, conversing with another person, or even merely consulting one's memories. Part of the reason for using the term in this way is that, as we will see in chapter 3, certain interpretations of quantum mechanics do actually suggest that all of these kinds of interactions involve the same kind of process as a more conventional 'quantum measurement,' so it is sensible to treat measurement in the most general possible sense here.

Thus construed, 'measurement' is "quite a special kind of category. On the one hand, it is an ontological category: a measurement is a physical process and so, at least in the context of physicalism or any other flavour of scientific realism, it is natural to think we should be able to describe what goes on during a measurement in purely physical terms. But measurement is also an epistemic category: it is nothing more or less than the ultimate contact point between our experience and physical reality. As van Fraassen (2008, p.143) put it, 'Measurement is an operator by whose means we gather information: but this is of course done by way of a physical interaction between apparatus and object, to play the information-providing role; and thus measurement has both 'physical and intentional aspects.'

Our solution to the Measurement Problem explores that information-providing role.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics is the puzzle of how a smooth, multiple-possibility wave function collapses into a single, definite reality when someone looks at or measures it.

Quantum physicists from Werner Heisenberg and John Von Neumann to John Bell speculated that somewhere in the mind of the observer there is a "cut" or "Schnitt" that is the cause of the collapse. The solution is to see how new observable information is created by a measurement.

The mind of the observer has nothing to do with measurement. Today's measurement devices are often controlled by computers! The fundamental measurement event is the creation of new information, as little as a single bit of particle spin down or spin up, recorded in the measurement apparatus, and later available for any observer to see/measure.

In the cosmic creation process one new bit of information (negentropy) requires at least one bit of positive entropy to be radiated away to satisfy the second law of thermodynamics.

Normal | Teacher | Scholar