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Topics
Introduction
Problems Freedom Knowledge Mind Life Chance Quantum Entanglement Scandals Philosophers Mortimer Adler Rogers Albritton Alexander of Aphrodisias Samuel Alexander William Alston Anaximander G.E.M.Anscombe Anselm Louise Antony Thomas Aquinas Aristotle David Armstrong Harald Atmanspacher Robert Audi Augustine J.L.Austin A.J.Ayer Alexander Bain Mark Balaguer Jeffrey Barrett William Barrett William Belsham Henri Bergson George Berkeley Isaiah Berlin Richard J. Bernstein Bernard Berofsky Robert Bishop Max Black Susan Blackmore Susanne Bobzien Emil du Bois-Reymond Hilary Bok Laurence BonJour George Boole Émile Boutroux Daniel Boyd F.H.Bradley C.D.Broad Michael Burke Jeremy Butterfield Lawrence Cahoone C.A.Campbell Joseph Keim Campbell Rudolf Carnap Carneades Nancy Cartwright Gregg Caruso Ernst Cassirer David Chalmers Roderick Chisholm Chrysippus Cicero Tom Clark Randolph Clarke Samuel Clarke Anthony Collins August Compte Antonella Corradini Diodorus Cronus Jonathan Dancy Donald Davidson Mario De Caro Democritus William Dembski Brendan Dempsey Daniel Dennett Jacques Derrida René Descartes John Dewey Richard Double Fred Dretske Curt Ducasse John Earman Laura Waddell Ekstrom Epictetus Epicurus Austin Farrer Herbert Feigl Arthur Fine John Martin Fischer Kuno Fischer Frederic Fitch Owen Flanagan Luciano Floridi Philippa Foot Alfred Fouilleé Harry Frankfurt Richard L. Franklin Bas van Fraassen Michael Frede Gottlob Frege Peter Geach Edmund Gettier Carl Ginet Alvin Goldman Gorgias Nicholas St. John Green Niels Henrik Gregersen H.Paul Grice Ian Hacking Ishtiyaque Haji Stuart Hampshire W.F.R.Hardie Sam Harris William Hasker R.M.Hare Georg W.F. Hegel Martin Heidegger Heraclitus R.E.Hobart Thomas Hobbes David Hodgson Shadsworth Hodgson Baron d'Holbach Ted Honderich Pamela Huby David Hume Ferenc Huoranszki Frank Jackson William James Lord Kames Robert Kane Immanuel Kant Tomis Kapitan Walter Kaufmann Jaegwon Kim William King Hilary Kornblith Christine Korsgaard Saul Kripke Thomas Kuhn Andrea Lavazza James Ladyman Christoph Lehner Keith Lehrer Gottfried Leibniz Jules Lequyer Leucippus Michael Levin Joseph Levine George Henry Lewes C.I.Lewis David Lewis Peter Lipton C. Lloyd Morgan John Locke Michael Lockwood Arthur O. Lovejoy E. Jonathan Lowe John R. Lucas Lucretius Alasdair MacIntyre Ruth Barcan Marcus Tim Maudlin James Martineau Nicholas Maxwell Storrs McCall Hugh McCann Colin McGinn Michael McKenna Brian McLaughlin John McTaggart Paul E. Meehl Uwe Meixner Alfred Mele Trenton Merricks John Stuart Mill Dickinson Miller G.E.Moore Ernest Nagel Thomas Nagel Otto Neurath Friedrich Nietzsche John Norton P.H.Nowell-Smith Robert Nozick William of Ockham Timothy O'Connor Parmenides David F. Pears Charles Sanders Peirce Derk Pereboom Gualtiero Piccinini Steven Pinker U.T.Place Plato Karl Popper Porphyry Huw Price H.A.Prichard Protagoras Hilary Putnam Willard van Orman Quine Frank Ramsey Ayn Rand Michael Rea Thomas Reid Charles Renouvier Nicholas Rescher C.W.Rietdijk Richard Rorty Josiah Royce Bertrand Russell Paul Russell Gilbert Ryle Jean-Paul Sartre Kenneth Sayre T.M.Scanlon Moritz Schlick John Duns Scotus Albert Schweitzer Arthur Schopenhauer John Searle Wilfrid Sellars David Shiang Alan Sidelle Ted Sider Henry Sidgwick Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Peter Slezak J.J.C.Smart Saul Smilansky Michael Smith Baruch Spinoza L. Susan Stebbing Isabelle Stengers George F. Stout Galen Strawson Peter Strawson Eleonore Stump Francisco Suárez Richard Taylor Kevin Timpe Mark Twain Peter Unger Peter van Inwagen Manuel Vargas John Venn Kadri Vihvelin Voltaire G.H. von Wright David Foster Wallace R. Jay Wallace W.G.Ward Ted Warfield Roy Weatherford C.F. von Weizsäcker William Whewell Alfred North Whitehead David Widerker David Wiggins Bernard Williams Timothy Williamson Ludwig Wittgenstein Susan Wolf Xenophon Scientists Emily Adlam David Albert Philip W. Anderson Michael Arbib Bobby Azarian Walter Baade Bernard Baars Jeffrey Bada Guido Bacciagaluppi Leslie Ballentine Marcello Barbieri Jacob Barandes Julian Barbour Horace Barlow Gregory Bateson Jakob Bekenstein John S. Bell Mara Beller Charles Bennett Ludwig von Bertalanffy Susan Blackmore Margaret Boden David Bohm Niels Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann John Tyler Bonner Emile Borel Max Born Satyendra Nath Bose Walther Bothe Jean Bricmont Hans Briegel Leon Brillouin Daniel Brooks Stephen Brush Henry Thomas Buckle S. H. Burbury Melvin Calvin William Calvin Donald Campbell John O. Campbell Sadi Carnot Sean B. Carroll Anthony Cashmore Eric Cavalcanti Eric Chaisson Gregory Chaitin Jean-Pierre Changeux Rudolf Clausius Arthur Holly Compton John Conway Simon Conway-Morris Peter Corning George Cowan Jerry Coyne John Cramer Francis Crick E. P. Culverwell Antonio Damasio Olivier Darrigol Charles Darwin Paul Davies Richard Dawkins Terrence Deacon Lüder Deecke Richard Dedekind Louis de Broglie Stanislas Dehaene Max Delbrück Abraham de Moivre David Depew Bernard d'Espagnat Paul Dirac Theodosius Dobzhansky Hans Driesch John Dupré John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Gerald Edelman Paul Ehrenfest Manfred Eigen Albert Einstein George F. R. Ellis Walter Elsasser Hugh Everett, III Franz Exner Richard Feynman R. A. Fisher David Foster Joseph Fourier George Fox Philipp Frank Steven Frautschi Edward Fredkin Augustin-Jean Fresnel Karl Friston Benjamin Gal-Or Howard Gardner Lila Gatlin Michael Gazzaniga Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen GianCarlo Ghirardi J. Willard Gibbs James J. Gibson Nicolas Gisin Paul Glimcher Thomas Gold A. O. Gomes Brian Goodwin Julian Gough Joshua Greene Dirk ter Haar Jacques Hadamard Mark Hadley Ernst Haeckel Patrick Haggard J. B. S. Haldane Stuart Hameroff Augustin Hamon Sam Harris Ralph Hartley Hyman Hartman Jeff Hawkins John-Dylan Haynes Donald Hebb Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg Hermann von Helmholtz Grete Hermann John Herschel Francis Heylighen Basil Hiley Art Hobson Jesper Hoffmeyer John Holland Don Howard John H. Jackson Ray Jackendoff Roman Jakobson E. T. Jaynes William Stanley Jevons Pascual Jordan Eric Kandel Ruth E. Kastner Stuart Kauffman Martin J. Klein William R. Klemm Christof Koch Simon Kochen Hans Kornhuber Stephen Kosslyn Daniel Koshland Ladislav Kovàč Leopold Kronecker Bernd-Olaf Küppers Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé Pierre-Simon Laplace Karl Lashley David Layzer Joseph LeDoux Gerald Lettvin Michael Levin Gilbert Lewis Benjamin Libet David Lindley Seth Lloyd Werner Loewenstein Hendrik Lorentz Josef Loschmidt Alfred Lotka Ernst Mach Donald MacKay Henry Margenau Lynn Margulis Owen Maroney David Marr Humberto Maturana James Clerk Maxwell John Maynard Smith Ernst Mayr John McCarthy Barbara McClintock Warren McCulloch N. David Mermin George Miller Stanley Miller Ulrich Mohrhoff Jacques Monod Vernon Mountcastle Gerd B. Müller Markus P. Müller Emmy Noether Denis Noble Donald Norman Travis Norsen Howard T. Odum Alexander Oparin Abraham Pais Howard Pattee Wolfgang Pauli Massimo Pauri Wilder Penfield Roger Penrose Massimo Pigliucci Steven Pinker Colin Pittendrigh Walter Pitts Max Planck Susan Pockett Henri Poincaré Michael Polanyi Daniel Pollen Ilya Prigogine Hans Primas Giulio Prisco Zenon Pylyshyn Henry Quastler Adolphe Quételet Pasco Rakic Nicolas Rashevsky Lord Rayleigh Frederick Reif Jürgen Renn Giacomo Rizzolati A.A. Roback Emil Roduner Juan Roederer Robert Rosen Frank Rosenblatt Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle David Rumelhart Michael Ruse Stanley Salthe Robert Sapolsky Tilman Sauer Ferdinand de Saussure Jürgen Schmidhuber Erwin Schrödinger Aaron Schurger Sebastian Seung Thomas Sebeok Franco Selleri Claude Shannon James A. Shapiro Charles Sherrington Abner Shimony Herbert Simon Dean Keith Simonton Edmund Sinnott B. F. Skinner Lee Smolin Ray Solomonoff Herbert Spencer Roger Sperry John Stachel Kenneth Stanley Henry Stapp Ian Stewart Tom Stonier Antoine Suarez Leonard Susskind Leo Szilard Max Tegmark Teilhard de Chardin Libb Thims William Thomson (Kelvin) Richard Tolman Giulio Tononi Peter Tse Alan Turing Robert Ulanowicz C. S. Unnikrishnan Nico van Kampen Antony Valentini Francisco Varela Vlatko Vedral Vladimir Vernadsky Clément Vidal Mikhail Volkenstein Heinz von Foerster Richard von Mises John von Neumann Jakob von Uexküll C. H. Waddington Sara Imari Walker James D. Watson John B. Watson Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg August Weismann Paul A. Weiss Herman Weyl John Wheeler Jeffrey Wicken Wilhelm Wien Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wiley E. O. Wilson Günther Witzany Carl Woese Stephen Wolfram H. Dieter Zeh Semir Zeki Ernst Zermelo Wojciech Zurek Konrad Zuse Fritz Zwicky Presentations ABCD Harvard (ppt) Bhaktivedanta Institute Biosemiotics Free Will Mental Causation James Symposium CCS25 Talk Evo Devo September 12 Evo Devo October 2 Evo Devo Davies Nov12 |
Eric Cavalcanti
In 2012, with Howard Wiseman, Cavalcanti wrote...
The 1964 theorem of John Bell shows that no model that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics can simultaneously satisfy the assumptions of locality and determinism. On the other hand, the assumptions of signal locality plus predictability are also sufficient to derive Bell inequalities. This simple theorem, previously noted but published only relatively recently by Masanes, Acin and Gisin, has fundamental implications not entirely appreciated. Firstly, nothing can be concluded about the ontological assumptions of locality or determinism independently of each other—it is possible to reproduce quantum mechanics with deterministic models that violate locality as well as indeterministic models that satisfy locality. On the other hand, the operational assumption of signal locality is an empirically testable (and well-tested) consequence of relativity. Thus Bell inequality violations imply that we can trust that some events are fundamentally unpredictable, even if we cannot trust that they are indeterministic.Signal locality is the same as the no-signaling theorem. The Bell inequalities show that widely separated events have non-local correlations that cannot have been caused by signals between the events or actions of one event on the other ("spooky" action at a distance). Seven years later, with Raymond Lai, Cavalcanti wrote... Bell's 1964 theorem causes a severe problem for the notion that correlations require explanation, encapsulated in Reichenbach's Principle of Common Cause. Despite being a hallmark of scientific thought, dropping the principle has been widely regarded as a much less bitter medicine than the perceived alternative---dropping relativistic causality. Recently, however, some authors have proposed that modified forms of Reichenbach's principle could be maintained even with relativistic causality. Here we break down Reichenbach's principle into two independent assumptions---the Principle of Common Cause proper, and Factorisation of Probabilities. We show how Bell's theorem can be derived from these two assumptions plus Relativistic Causality and the Law of Total Probability for actual events, and we review proposals to drop each of these assumptions in light of the theorem... To better explore the connection between the Principle of Common Cause, Bell’s notion of Local Causality (LC), and the multiple responses to the dilemma imposed by Bell’s theorem, we will use a weaker definition of the R- PCC, that does not imply separability of probabilities, as follows. Definition 1 (Principle of Common Cause (PCC)). If two events A and B are correlated, i.e., if P (A, B) > P (A)P (B), then either: (i) A and B are directly causally connected, i.e. either A causes B or B causes A, or (ii) A and B share a common cause that explains the correlation. Definition 2 (Factorisation of probabilities (FP)). Two events have a common cause if and only if there exists a sufficient specification of variables λ corresponding to events in the common causal past of A and B such that conditioned on those variables the joint probability of A and B factorises:Relativistic causality is the physical principle that a cause must always happen before its effect for every observer. In space-time diagrams, the cause of an event must be in the past light cone of the event. Recently Jacob Barandes and Travis Norsen have drawn illustrative diagrams... Barandes "especially thanks" Norsen, who mentions Bell's formulation of local causality and illustrates Barandes' point about overlapping past light cones.
Fig. 8.4 Space-time regions relevant to Bell’s formulation of local causality. Bell writes: “Full specification of what happens in 3 makes events in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1 in a locally causal theory.” This is what Cavalcanti refers to as the screening-off condition."But Norsen then explicitly shows how a common cause from the initial entanglement is still in the past light cone of the "separated" measurements at A and B.
Fig. 8.5 Space-time diagram for the Bell experiment. The particle pair is emitted at the “flash’' at the bottom of the diagram; world-lines for the two individual particles flying apart in opposite directions are represented by the gray dashed lines. The (large!) region 3 encompasses both particles at some intermediate time and "screens off" the two measurement regions, 1 and 2. from their overlapping past light cones in the way that is required in Bell's formulation of locality.
Suppose that the two subsystems Q and R are not kept at spacelike separation during the physical process in question, but locally interact at some intermediate time t′ between 0 and t. Then, again following standard textbook arguments, the overall system’s unitary time-evolution operator UQR(t) will fail to tensor-factorize at t′:
Note that the intermediate time t' is precisely the moment the particles Q and R are in contact and causally local entangled. These causally local influences do not propagate faster than light. Erwin Schrödinger said ΨAB cannot be represented as a simple product of two independent single-particle states ΨA ΨB.
This is Barandes' failure of tensor-factorization and perhaps Cavalcanti's factorisation of probabilities (FP)?
Schrödinger's wave function ΨAB is in a linear combination or superposition of ΨA↑ ΨB↓ and ΨA⇵ ΨB↑. A measurement or a "collapse" of ΨAB produces either A-up and B-down or A-down and B-up. Either conserves total spin as zero, and makes either outcome quantum random, as quantum encryption codes require.
UQR(t′) ≠ UQ(t′) ⊗ UR(t′). (59) Because the corresponding transition matrix ΓQR(t) encodes cumulative statistical effects starting at the initial time 0, the transition matrix will continue to fail to tensor-factorize for all times t ≥ t′ (at least until the next division event): ΓQR(t) ≠ ΓQ(t) ⊗ ΓR(t) [for t ≥ t′]. (60) The breakdown in tensor-factorization for t ≥ t′ is precisely entanglement, as manifested at the level of the underlying indivisible stochastic process... so one can conclude that the two subsystems Q and R exert causal influences on each other, stemming from their local interaction at the time t′.
The initial entanglement at t' is an initial casually local event that puts the particles in a spherically symmetric state with total spin zero.
During the time evolution from t' to t, the conservation of spin angular momentum is a condition or constraint on total spin (a "hidden constant" if not a hidden variable?) that will locally cause? the measurements at A and B to be perfectly correlated as long as Alice and Bob agree ahead of time t to measure at the same angle (maintaining planar symmetry).
If their measurements diverge by angle Θ, correlations will fall off by cos2Θ, as observed in all Bell experiments. (the "law of Malus")
Notice that this local interaction, despite being the ‘common cause’ of the correlations between Q and R, is not the sort of ‘variable’ that can be plugged into the unistochastic theory’s microphysical conditional probabilities. Reichenbach’s principle of common causes therefore does not hold.In 2022, Cavalcanti developed a new theorem with Howard Wiseman that they called a "thoughtful" Local Friendliness no-go theorem. A recent paper by two of us and co-workers, based on an extended Wigner's friend scenario, demonstrated that certain empirical correlations predicted by quantum theory (QT) violate inequalities derived from a set of metaphysical assumptions we called "Local Friendliness" (LF)...Crucial to the theorem was the premise that a quantum system with reversible evolution could be an observer (colloquially, a "friend"). However, that paper was noncommittal on what would constitute an observer for the purpose of an experiment. Here, we present a new LF no-go theorem which takes seriously the idea that a system's having *thoughts* is a sufficient condition for it to be an observer.The information philosophy interpretation of measurement is that it has nothing to do with mind or consciousness, . A measurement occurs when new information is created that is visible to any observer. See the Measurement Problem and . Normal | Teacher | Scholar |