Philosophers
Mortimer Adler Rogers Albritton Alexander of Aphrodisias Samuel Alexander William Alston Anaximander G.E.M.Anscombe Anselm Louise Antony Thomas Aquinas Aristotle David Armstrong Harald Atmanspacher Robert Audi Augustine J.L.Austin A.J.Ayer Alexander Bain Mark Balaguer Jeffrey Barrett William Barrett William Belsham Henri Bergson George Berkeley Isaiah Berlin Richard J. Bernstein Bernard Berofsky Robert Bishop Max Black Susanne Bobzien Emil du Bois-Reymond Hilary Bok Laurence BonJour George Boole Émile Boutroux Daniel Boyd F.H.Bradley C.D.Broad Michael Burke Lawrence Cahoone C.A.Campbell Joseph Keim Campbell Rudolf Carnap Carneades Nancy Cartwright Gregg Caruso Ernst Cassirer David Chalmers Roderick Chisholm Chrysippus Cicero Tom Clark Randolph Clarke Samuel Clarke Anthony Collins Antonella Corradini Diodorus Cronus Jonathan Dancy Donald Davidson Mario De Caro Democritus Daniel Dennett Jacques Derrida René Descartes Richard Double Fred Dretske John Dupré John Earman Laura Waddell Ekstrom Epictetus Epicurus Austin Farrer Herbert Feigl Arthur Fine John Martin Fischer Frederic Fitch Owen Flanagan Luciano Floridi Philippa Foot Alfred Fouilleé Harry Frankfurt Richard L. Franklin Bas van Fraassen Michael Frede Gottlob Frege Peter Geach Edmund Gettier Carl Ginet Alvin Goldman Gorgias Nicholas St. John Green H.Paul Grice Ian Hacking Ishtiyaque Haji Stuart Hampshire W.F.R.Hardie Sam Harris William Hasker R.M.Hare Georg W.F. Hegel Martin Heidegger Heraclitus R.E.Hobart Thomas Hobbes David Hodgson Shadsworth Hodgson Baron d'Holbach Ted Honderich Pamela Huby David Hume Ferenc Huoranszki Frank Jackson William James Lord Kames Robert Kane Immanuel Kant Tomis Kapitan Walter Kaufmann Jaegwon Kim William King Hilary Kornblith Christine Korsgaard Saul Kripke Thomas Kuhn Andrea Lavazza Christoph Lehner Keith Lehrer Gottfried Leibniz Jules Lequyer Leucippus Michael Levin Joseph Levine George Henry Lewes C.I.Lewis David Lewis Peter Lipton C. Lloyd Morgan John Locke Michael Lockwood Arthur O. Lovejoy E. Jonathan Lowe John R. Lucas Lucretius Alasdair MacIntyre Ruth Barcan Marcus Tim Maudlin James Martineau Nicholas Maxwell Storrs McCall Hugh McCann Colin McGinn Michael McKenna Brian McLaughlin John McTaggart Paul E. Meehl Uwe Meixner Alfred Mele Trenton Merricks John Stuart Mill Dickinson Miller G.E.Moore Thomas Nagel Otto Neurath Friedrich Nietzsche John Norton P.H.Nowell-Smith Robert Nozick William of Ockham Timothy O'Connor Parmenides David F. Pears Charles Sanders Peirce Derk Pereboom Steven Pinker Plato Karl Popper Porphyry Huw Price H.A.Prichard Protagoras Hilary Putnam Willard van Orman Quine Frank Ramsey Ayn Rand Michael Rea Thomas Reid Charles Renouvier Nicholas Rescher C.W.Rietdijk Richard Rorty Josiah Royce Bertrand Russell Paul Russell Gilbert Ryle Jean-Paul Sartre Kenneth Sayre T.M.Scanlon Moritz Schlick Arthur Schopenhauer John Searle Wilfrid Sellars Alan Sidelle Ted Sider Henry Sidgwick Walter Sinnott-Armstrong J.J.C.Smart Saul Smilansky Michael Smith Baruch Spinoza L. Susan Stebbing Isabelle Stengers George F. Stout Galen Strawson Peter Strawson Eleonore Stump Francisco Suárez Richard Taylor Kevin Timpe Mark Twain Peter Unger Peter van Inwagen Manuel Vargas John Venn Kadri Vihvelin Voltaire G.H. von Wright David Foster Wallace R. Jay Wallace W.G.Ward Ted Warfield Roy Weatherford C.F. von Weizsäcker William Whewell Alfred North Whitehead David Widerker David Wiggins Bernard Williams Timothy Williamson Ludwig Wittgenstein Susan Wolf Scientists David Albert Michael Arbib Walter Baade Bernard Baars Jeffrey Bada Leslie Ballentine Marcello Barbieri Gregory Bateson Horace Barlow John S. Bell Mara Beller Charles Bennett Ludwig von Bertalanffy Susan Blackmore Margaret Boden David Bohm Niels Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann Emile Borel Max Born Satyendra Nath Bose Walther Bothe Jean Bricmont Hans Briegel Leon Brillouin Stephen Brush Henry Thomas Buckle S. H. Burbury Melvin Calvin Donald Campbell Sadi Carnot Anthony Cashmore Eric Chaisson Gregory Chaitin Jean-Pierre Changeux Rudolf Clausius Arthur Holly Compton John Conway Jerry Coyne John Cramer Francis Crick E. P. Culverwell Antonio Damasio Olivier Darrigol Charles Darwin Richard Dawkins Terrence Deacon Lüder Deecke Richard Dedekind Louis de Broglie Stanislas Dehaene Max Delbrück Abraham de Moivre Bernard d'Espagnat Paul Dirac Hans Driesch John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Gerald Edelman Paul Ehrenfest Manfred Eigen Albert Einstein George F. R. Ellis Hugh Everett, III Franz Exner Richard Feynman R. A. Fisher David Foster Joseph Fourier Philipp Frank Steven Frautschi Edward Fredkin Benjamin Gal-Or Howard Gardner Lila Gatlin Michael Gazzaniga Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen GianCarlo Ghirardi J. Willard Gibbs James J. Gibson Nicolas Gisin Paul Glimcher Thomas Gold A. O. Gomes Brian Goodwin Joshua Greene Dirk ter Haar Jacques Hadamard Mark Hadley Patrick Haggard J. B. S. Haldane Stuart Hameroff Augustin Hamon Sam Harris Ralph Hartley Hyman Hartman Jeff Hawkins John-Dylan Haynes Donald Hebb Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg John Herschel Basil Hiley Art Hobson Jesper Hoffmeyer Don Howard John H. Jackson William Stanley Jevons Roman Jakobson E. T. Jaynes Pascual Jordan Eric Kandel Ruth E. Kastner Stuart Kauffman Martin J. Klein William R. Klemm Christof Koch Simon Kochen Hans Kornhuber Stephen Kosslyn Daniel Koshland Ladislav Kovàč Leopold Kronecker Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé Pierre-Simon Laplace Karl Lashley David Layzer Joseph LeDoux Gerald Lettvin Gilbert Lewis Benjamin Libet David Lindley Seth Lloyd Hendrik Lorentz Werner Loewenstein Josef Loschmidt Ernst Mach Donald MacKay Henry Margenau Owen Maroney David Marr Humberto Maturana James Clerk Maxwell Ernst Mayr John McCarthy Warren McCulloch N. David Mermin George Miller Stanley Miller Ulrich Mohrhoff Jacques Monod Vernon Mountcastle Emmy Noether Donald Norman Alexander Oparin Abraham Pais Howard Pattee Wolfgang Pauli Massimo Pauri Wilder Penfield Roger Penrose Steven Pinker Colin Pittendrigh Walter Pitts Max Planck Susan Pockett Henri Poincaré Daniel Pollen Ilya Prigogine Hans Primas Zenon Pylyshyn Henry Quastler Adolphe Quételet Pasco Rakic Nicolas Rashevsky Lord Rayleigh Frederick Reif Jürgen Renn Giacomo Rizzolati A.A. Roback Emil Roduner Juan Roederer Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle David Rumelhart Robert Sapolsky Tilman Sauer Ferdinand de Saussure Jürgen Schmidhuber Erwin Schrödinger Aaron Schurger Sebastian Seung Thomas Sebeok Franco Selleri Claude Shannon Charles Sherrington David Shiang Abner Shimony Herbert Simon Dean Keith Simonton Edmund Sinnott B. F. Skinner Lee Smolin Ray Solomonoff Roger Sperry John Stachel Henry Stapp Tom Stonier Antoine Suarez Leo Szilard Max Tegmark Teilhard de Chardin Libb Thims William Thomson (Kelvin) Richard Tolman Giulio Tononi Peter Tse Alan Turing Francisco Varela Vlatko Vedral Mikhail Volkenstein Heinz von Foerster Richard von Mises John von Neumann Jakob von Uexküll C. S. Unnikrishnan C. H. Waddington John B. Watson Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg Paul A. Weiss Herman Weyl John Wheeler Wilhelm Wien Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wilson Günther Witzany Stephen Wolfram H. Dieter Zeh Semir Zeki Ernst Zermelo Wojciech Zurek Konrad Zuse Fritz Zwicky Presentations Biosemiotics Free Will Mental Causation James Symposium |
Anselm
Anselm of Canterbury was known as the founder or Scholasticism and originator of the ontological argument for the existence of God. (A perfect being must exist.)
He developed a theory for the freedom of the will in his De Libertate Arbitrii (On Freedom of Choice) somewhat different from that of Augustine (De Libero Arbitrio), in that he combined two of Augustine's senses into one. These are theories on the freedom of the will and not compatibilist notions that we call "freedom of action" or Isaiah Berlin calls "negative freedom."
It is convenient to refer to them by Mortimer Adler's three kinds of freedom. In The Idea of Freedom, vol.I, Adler classifies all freedoms into three categories:
The freedom we have identified as circumstantial is variously called "economic freedom," "political freedom," "civil liberty," "individual freedom," "the freedom of man in society," "freedom in relation to the state," and "external freedom." It is sometimes referred to negatively as "freedom from coercion or restraint," "freedom from restrictions," or "freedom from law," and sometimes positively as "freedom of action," "freedom of spontaneity," or "freedom under law."The Acquired Freedom of Self-perfection is the idea from Plato to Anselm to Kant that we are only free when our decisions are for reasons and we are not slaves to our passions (making moral choices rather than satisfying desires). This is the acquired or learned knowledge to distinguish right from wrong, good from evil, true from false, etc. Anselm calls this libertas, in which man is only free when following a divine moral law. Sinners, says Anselm, do not have this kind of free will, which is odd because sinners are presumably responsible for evil in the world despite an omniscient and omnipotent God. Instead, Anselm says that those who have the ability (posse) to sin or not to sin have what he calls liberum arbitrium, this is the ability to choose from among alternative possibilities, some of which may include self interest. For Anselm, thanks to God's grace, only God and the angels have pure libertas. Anselm cites the example of an agent who is given the choice to lie or to die. Shall he do the right thing and tell the truth, in which case he dies, or do what is in his self-interest and lie? Compare Robert Kane's example of the businesswoman who has to choose between aiding a victim in an alley or going on to her business meeting. This is Adler's Natural Freedom of Self-Determination. According to G. Stanley Kane, Anselm combines libertas and liberum arbitrium. This makes sense, because pure freedom (libertas) is to live a perfect life in God's grace, whereas a more normal sense of free will (liberum arbitrium) involves judgment, decisions between alternatives (including moral decisions). In the intellectual tradition that he received, Anselm inherited two distinct notions of freedom. In one, freedom is thought of as the state in which a person is exempt from all possibility of sin or corruption—the state of sinless perfection. Here freedom is the ability to fulfill completely the will of God. The only way to possess this freedom is to attain it or merit it (which, of course, cannot be done without the grace of God). In this notion, while "freedom" designates a state or condition, it also designates a subjective power or capacity. Freedom is the state of sinless perfection and the power to maintain that state. The antithesis of this kind of freedom is sin or the ability to sin.
On God's Omnipotence and Omniscience
In the first edition of my book on Free Will (p.5), I argued that God could not logically be both omnipotent and omniscient. I thought I had discovered this logical contradiction. But reading Richard Sorabji's excellent book Necessity, Cause, and Blame. I was mistakenly led to believe that Anselm had considered this contradiction. I wrote this in 2011.
On Omniscience, Omnipotence, Benevolence In passing, it is worth noting that the idea of God as an omniscient and omnipotent being has an internal logical contradiction that is rarely discussed by the theologians.1 If such a being had perfect knowledge of the future, like Laplace’s demon, who knows the positions, velocities, and forces for all the particles, it would be perfectly impotent. Because if God had the power to change even one thing about the future, his presumed perfect knowledge would have been imperfect. Omniscience entails impotence. Omnipotence some ignorance. As to benevolence, Archibald MacLeish said in J.B, “If God is Good, He is not God. If God is God, He is Not Good.”A careful rereading of Sorabji, as well as Anselm's Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio tells me that Anselm did not in fact reach my 2011 conclusion. First, Sorabji wrote (p.126), Anselm had earlier been worried by the determinist objection that what is eternal cannot be changed.Sorabji might here have understood Anselm saying that since God's knowledge is eternal, the deterministic future cannot be changed destroying God's omnipotence. But Anselm has no such clear logical thinking. Sorabji tells us so on his next page 127. He [Anselm] replied that the very same thing, which, as eternal, is immutable, is also in time, and hence mutable.Does Anselm think God's eternal (omniscient foreknowledge) is compatible with God's omnipotent power to change the future? And in Anselm's Concordia we find examples of Anselm believing blatant logical contradictions in defense of God's powers, for example God's omniscient foreknowledge and human free will. I think I have demonstrated with the help of God’s grace that no impossibility is involved in the coexistence of God’s foreknowledge and our free choice and that no unsolvable objection can be raised if someone carefully weighs my words. For Teachers
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