Thomas M. Scanlon Jr.
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Thomas M. Scanlon Jr.
Thomas M. ("Tim") Scanlon is a moral philosopher who was greatly influenced by Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Thomas Nagel.
Scanlon has tried to narrow the problem of the nature of morality to judgments of right and wrong, and to our reasons for accepting or rejecting such judgments. He finds that moral judgments depend upon principles that we can justify to others in the sense that such principles could not be reasonably rejected. When I ask myself what reason the fact that an action would be wrong provides me with not to do it, my answer is that such an action would be one that I could not justify to others on grounds I could expect them to accept. This leads me to describe the subject matter of judgments of right and wrong by saying that they are judgments about what would be permitted by principles that could not reasonably be rejected, by people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject. In particular, an act is wrong if and only if any principle that permitted it would be one that could reasonably be rejected by people with the motivation just described (or, equivalently, if and only if it would be disallowed by any principle that such people could not reasonably reject).Scanlon's search for a community consensus on principles that generally regulate human behavior resembles the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, who made the intersubjective agreement of a community of inquirers the basis for objective scientific knowledge. This idea of a shared willingness to modify our private demands in order to find a justification that others have a reason to accept also resembles various "social contract" ideas like those of Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Indeed, Scanlon calls his moral theory "social contractualism." Scanlon says that his theory is a departure from standard Kantian deontology, which assumes that our "self-legislation" according to a moral law (the categorical imperative) is "autonomous." He recognizes that the cultural dependence of his theory makes it openly "heteronomous" and dependent on hypothetical imperatives. He says: [My] account of the reasons supporting our concern with the rightness of our actions is very different from Kant's. My strategy is to describe these reasons in substantive terms that make clear why we should find them compelling. While Kant sought to explain the special authority of moral requirements by showing how they are grounded in conditions of our rational agency, I try to explain the distinctive importance and authority of the requirements of justifiability to others by showing how other aspects of our lives and our relations with others involve this idea. The result is an account of right and wrong that is, in Kant's terms, avowedly heteronomous. Scanlon thus narrows the focus of his moral research to the domain of our duties to other people, requirements to aid them, prohibitions on harming them, etc. This is the subject matter of most contemporary moral philosophy, he says. Rather than giving it a new technical name, he calls it simply "What We Owe To Each Other." Because the community process of arriving at principles that cannot be reasonably rejected resembles the deliberative process whereby an individual agent evaluates presented alternatives and arrives at a decision, Scanlon calls his idea a "system of co-deliberation." The part of morality with which I am mainly concerned is sometimes seen as a system of restraints which we accept in order to gain protection against the harmful conduct of others. Moral criticism (in this context, chiefly blame) is then seen as a sanction that is supposed to move people to comply with these constraints. On my view, by contrast, this part of morality is not, fundamentally, a mechanism of control and protection but, rather, what I call a system of co-deliberation, and moral reasoning is an attempt to work out principles that each of us could be asked to employ as a basis for deliberation and accept as a basis of criticism. Seeking such principles is part of what is involved in recognizing each other's value as rational creatures, Our needs for protection and for the assistance of others play a role in determining which principles it is reasonable for us to reject and which to accept, and hence in determining which actions are right and wrong.In his 2008 book, Moral Dimensions, Scanlon redefines three general notions - permissibility, meaning, and blame - as "dimensions" in the problem of moral responsibility. His analysis of permissibility starts with the doctrine of "double effect," the idea that a given action may be permissible or impermissible depending on the intentions of the agent. In the famous "trolley problem" of Philippa Foot, a runaway trolley threatens to kill five workers ahead on the track, unless it is diverted to a siding that would unfortunately kill a single worker. Double effect says that although the death of the single worker is foreseen, it is nevertheless permissible as long as the intent is to save the lives of the five. Should the intent be to kill the one in order to save the five, the diversion would be impermissible. Scanlon argues that the intention of the agent depends on attitudes that may impair his or her relations with others. In short, he or she may not have proper regard for "what we owe to each other." For Scanlon, what he calls the "meaning" of an action depends critically on the agent's attitudes or intentions. Having the wrong attitudes or intentions renders the agent blameworthy. Being blameworthy may justify others who may blame the agent, but the content of the blame depends on the significance, for the person doing the blaming, of the agent and what he has done. This significance depends on the attitudes of the agent and those of the person doing the blaming, which affects "what they owe to each other.". In his introduction to Moral Dimensions, Scanlon says: To say that in a certain action the agent was "just using" another person can be an observation about the meaning of that action, and the fact that an action has this meaning can sometimes be relevant to its permissibility.Scanlon discusses the idea of the freedom needed in terms of the accuracy of the agent's intentions (she may have been misinformed) and the opportunity she had to avoid the action taken (the opportunity to do otherwise). Many people believe that blame presupposes freedom, and thus that it is never appropriate to blame people if all of their actions are caused by factors outside of them, over which they have no control. What is not commonly explained is why this should be so — or rather, what it is about blame that entails this requirement of freedom. In this section I will consider two possible explanations, which I call the requirement of psychological accuracy and the requirement of adequate opportunity to avoid. My aim is to examine these reasons for thinking that blame requires some kind of freedom and to see how they apply when blame is understood in the way I am suggesting. For Teachers
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