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Philosophers

Mortimer Adler
Rogers Albritton
Alexander of Aphrodisias
Samuel Alexander
William Alston
Anaximander
G.E.M.Anscombe
Anselm
Louise Antony
Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
David Armstrong
Harald Atmanspacher
Robert Audi
Augustine
J.L.Austin
A.J.Ayer
Alexander Bain
Mark Balaguer
Jeffrey Barrett
William Barrett
William Belsham
Henri Bergson
George Berkeley
Isaiah Berlin
Richard J. Bernstein
Bernard Berofsky
Robert Bishop
Max Black
Susanne Bobzien
Emil du Bois-Reymond
Hilary Bok
Laurence BonJour
George Boole
Émile Boutroux
Daniel Boyd
F.H.Bradley
C.D.Broad
Michael Burke
Jeremy Butterfield
Lawrence Cahoone
C.A.Campbell
Joseph Keim Campbell
Rudolf Carnap
Carneades
Nancy Cartwright
Gregg Caruso
Ernst Cassirer
David Chalmers
Roderick Chisholm
Chrysippus
Cicero
Tom Clark
Randolph Clarke
Samuel Clarke
Anthony Collins
Antonella Corradini
Diodorus Cronus
Jonathan Dancy
Donald Davidson
Mario De Caro
Democritus
Daniel Dennett
Jacques Derrida
René Descartes
Richard Double
Fred Dretske
John Dupré
John Earman
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Epictetus
Epicurus
Austin Farrer
Herbert Feigl
Arthur Fine
John Martin Fischer
Frederic Fitch
Owen Flanagan
Luciano Floridi
Philippa Foot
Alfred Fouilleé
Harry Frankfurt
Richard L. Franklin
Bas van Fraassen
Michael Frede
Gottlob Frege
Peter Geach
Edmund Gettier
Carl Ginet
Alvin Goldman
Gorgias
Nicholas St. John Green
H.Paul Grice
Ian Hacking
Ishtiyaque Haji
Stuart Hampshire
W.F.R.Hardie
Sam Harris
William Hasker
R.M.Hare
Georg W.F. Hegel
Martin Heidegger
Heraclitus
R.E.Hobart
Thomas Hobbes
David Hodgson
Shadsworth Hodgson
Baron d'Holbach
Ted Honderich
Pamela Huby
David Hume
Ferenc Huoranszki
Frank Jackson
William James
Lord Kames
Robert Kane
Immanuel Kant
Tomis Kapitan
Walter Kaufmann
Jaegwon Kim
William King
Hilary Kornblith
Christine Korsgaard
Saul Kripke
Thomas Kuhn
Andrea Lavazza
Christoph Lehner
Keith Lehrer
Gottfried Leibniz
Jules Lequyer
Leucippus
Michael Levin
Joseph Levine
George Henry Lewes
C.I.Lewis
David Lewis
Peter Lipton
C. Lloyd Morgan
John Locke
Michael Lockwood
Arthur O. Lovejoy
E. Jonathan Lowe
John R. Lucas
Lucretius
Alasdair MacIntyre
Ruth Barcan Marcus
Tim Maudlin
James Martineau
Nicholas Maxwell
Storrs McCall
Hugh McCann
Colin McGinn
Michael McKenna
Brian McLaughlin
John McTaggart
Paul E. Meehl
Uwe Meixner
Alfred Mele
Trenton Merricks
John Stuart Mill
Dickinson Miller
G.E.Moore
Thomas Nagel
Otto Neurath
Friedrich Nietzsche
John Norton
P.H.Nowell-Smith
Robert Nozick
William of Ockham
Timothy O'Connor
Parmenides
David F. Pears
Charles Sanders Peirce
Derk Pereboom
Steven Pinker
U.T.Place
Plato
Karl Popper
Porphyry
Huw Price
H.A.Prichard
Protagoras
Hilary Putnam
Willard van Orman Quine
Frank Ramsey
Ayn Rand
Michael Rea
Thomas Reid
Charles Renouvier
Nicholas Rescher
C.W.Rietdijk
Richard Rorty
Josiah Royce
Bertrand Russell
Paul Russell
Gilbert Ryle
Jean-Paul Sartre
Kenneth Sayre
T.M.Scanlon
Moritz Schlick
John Duns Scotus
Arthur Schopenhauer
John Searle
Wilfrid Sellars
David Shiang
Alan Sidelle
Ted Sider
Henry Sidgwick
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Peter Slezak
J.J.C.Smart
Saul Smilansky
Michael Smith
Baruch Spinoza
L. Susan Stebbing
Isabelle Stengers
George F. Stout
Galen Strawson
Peter Strawson
Eleonore Stump
Francisco Suárez
Richard Taylor
Kevin Timpe
Mark Twain
Peter Unger
Peter van Inwagen
Manuel Vargas
John Venn
Kadri Vihvelin
Voltaire
G.H. von Wright
David Foster Wallace
R. Jay Wallace
W.G.Ward
Ted Warfield
Roy Weatherford
C.F. von Weizsäcker
William Whewell
Alfred North Whitehead
David Widerker
David Wiggins
Bernard Williams
Timothy Williamson
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Susan Wolf

Scientists

David Albert
Michael Arbib
Walter Baade
Bernard Baars
Jeffrey Bada
Leslie Ballentine
Marcello Barbieri
Gregory Bateson
Horace Barlow
John S. Bell
Mara Beller
Charles Bennett
Ludwig von Bertalanffy
Susan Blackmore
Margaret Boden
David Bohm
Niels Bohr
Ludwig Boltzmann
Emile Borel
Max Born
Satyendra Nath Bose
Walther Bothe
Jean Bricmont
Hans Briegel
Leon Brillouin
Stephen Brush
Henry Thomas Buckle
S. H. Burbury
Melvin Calvin
Donald Campbell
Sadi Carnot
Anthony Cashmore
Eric Chaisson
Gregory Chaitin
Jean-Pierre Changeux
Rudolf Clausius
Arthur Holly Compton
John Conway
Jerry Coyne
John Cramer
Francis Crick
E. P. Culverwell
Antonio Damasio
Olivier Darrigol
Charles Darwin
Richard Dawkins
Terrence Deacon
Lüder Deecke
Richard Dedekind
Louis de Broglie
Stanislas Dehaene
Max Delbrück
Abraham de Moivre
Bernard d'Espagnat
Paul Dirac
Hans Driesch
John Eccles
Arthur Stanley Eddington
Gerald Edelman
Paul Ehrenfest
Manfred Eigen
Albert Einstein
George F. R. Ellis
Hugh Everett, III
Franz Exner
Richard Feynman
R. A. Fisher
David Foster
Joseph Fourier
Philipp Frank
Steven Frautschi
Edward Fredkin
Augustin-Jean Fresnel
Benjamin Gal-Or
Howard Gardner
Lila Gatlin
Michael Gazzaniga
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen
GianCarlo Ghirardi
J. Willard Gibbs
James J. Gibson
Nicolas Gisin
Paul Glimcher
Thomas Gold
A. O. Gomes
Brian Goodwin
Joshua Greene
Dirk ter Haar
Jacques Hadamard
Mark Hadley
Patrick Haggard
J. B. S. Haldane
Stuart Hameroff
Augustin Hamon
Sam Harris
Ralph Hartley
Hyman Hartman
Jeff Hawkins
John-Dylan Haynes
Donald Hebb
Martin Heisenberg
Werner Heisenberg
Grete Hermann
John Herschel
Basil Hiley
Art Hobson
Jesper Hoffmeyer
Don Howard
John H. Jackson
William Stanley Jevons
Roman Jakobson
E. T. Jaynes
Pascual Jordan
Eric Kandel
Ruth E. Kastner
Stuart Kauffman
Martin J. Klein
William R. Klemm
Christof Koch
Simon Kochen
Hans Kornhuber
Stephen Kosslyn
Daniel Koshland
Ladislav Kovàč
Leopold Kronecker
Rolf Landauer
Alfred Landé
Pierre-Simon Laplace
Karl Lashley
David Layzer
Joseph LeDoux
Gerald Lettvin
Gilbert Lewis
Benjamin Libet
David Lindley
Seth Lloyd
Werner Loewenstein
Hendrik Lorentz
Josef Loschmidt
Alfred Lotka
Ernst Mach
Donald MacKay
Henry Margenau
Owen Maroney
David Marr
Humberto Maturana
James Clerk Maxwell
Ernst Mayr
John McCarthy
Warren McCulloch
N. David Mermin
George Miller
Stanley Miller
Ulrich Mohrhoff
Jacques Monod
Vernon Mountcastle
Emmy Noether
Donald Norman
Travis Norsen
Alexander Oparin
Abraham Pais
Howard Pattee
Wolfgang Pauli
Massimo Pauri
Wilder Penfield
Roger Penrose
Steven Pinker
Colin Pittendrigh
Walter Pitts
Max Planck
Susan Pockett
Henri Poincaré
Daniel Pollen
Ilya Prigogine
Hans Primas
Zenon Pylyshyn
Henry Quastler
Adolphe Quételet
Pasco Rakic
Nicolas Rashevsky
Lord Rayleigh
Frederick Reif
Jürgen Renn
Giacomo Rizzolati
A.A. Roback
Emil Roduner
Juan Roederer
Jerome Rothstein
David Ruelle
David Rumelhart
Robert Sapolsky
Tilman Sauer
Ferdinand de Saussure
Jürgen Schmidhuber
Erwin Schrödinger
Aaron Schurger
Sebastian Seung
Thomas Sebeok
Franco Selleri
Claude Shannon
Charles Sherrington
Abner Shimony
Herbert Simon
Dean Keith Simonton
Edmund Sinnott
B. F. Skinner
Lee Smolin
Ray Solomonoff
Roger Sperry
John Stachel
Henry Stapp
Tom Stonier
Antoine Suarez
Leo Szilard
Max Tegmark
Teilhard de Chardin
Libb Thims
William Thomson (Kelvin)
Richard Tolman
Giulio Tononi
Peter Tse
Alan Turing
C. S. Unnikrishnan
Nico van Kampen
Francisco Varela
Vlatko Vedral
Vladimir Vernadsky
Mikhail Volkenstein
Heinz von Foerster
Richard von Mises
John von Neumann
Jakob von Uexküll
C. H. Waddington
John B. Watson
Daniel Wegner
Steven Weinberg
Paul A. Weiss
Herman Weyl
John Wheeler
Jeffrey Wicken
Wilhelm Wien
Norbert Wiener
Eugene Wigner
E. O. Wilson
Günther Witzany
Stephen Wolfram
H. Dieter Zeh
Semir Zeki
Ernst Zermelo
Wojciech Zurek
Konrad Zuse
Fritz Zwicky

Presentations

Biosemiotics
Free Will
Mental Causation
James Symposium
 
Biosemiotics

This web page is adapted from slides presented in June 2015 at the U.C. Berkeley Symposium -
"From Information to Semiosis."

You may link to the dynamic presentation slides here - informationphilosopher.com/presentations/Biosemiotics,.
There you can advance forward and backward in the presentation.
Below the slides are static in this one vertical page.

The Experience Recorder and Reproducer
What is the minimal mind model that a primitive organism needs to process the information needed for biosemiotic interpretant power?

The neuroscientist Donald Hebb said in 1949 that
"neurons that fire together wire together."

Information philosopher Bob Doyle suggests that
neurons that have been wired together will fire together.”

The ERR Recorder: Neurons become wired together (strengthening their synaptic connections to other neurons) during an organism’s experiences, across multiple sensory and limbic systems.

The ERR Reproducer: Later firing of even a part of the previously wired neurons can stimulate firing of all or part of many original complexes, thus "playing back" the original experiences (including the very important emotional reactions to the original experiences) producing William James’ “blooming, buzzing, confusion.”

Man is not a machine. And the mind is not a computer.

The ERR model stands in contrast to the popular cognitive science or “computational” model of a mind as a digital computer with a "central processor" or even many "parallel processors." No algorithms or stored programs are needed for the ERR model. There is nothing comparable to the addresses and data buses used to store and retrieve information in a digital computer. The mind is a biological information processor.

The ERR and Consciousness
At a conference on Free Will in Barcelona in 2010, Martin Heisenberg asked if I could develop proposals for evolutionary steps between his bacterial level and the human levels of free will. I decided to regard them as levels of consciousness about experiences in the Experience Recorder and Reproducer
Instinctive Consciousness - by animals with little or no learning capability. Automatic reactions to environmental conditions are transmitted genetically. Information about past experiences (by prior generations of the organism) is only present implicitly in the inherited reactions. (Konrad Lorenz- “What’s a priori in the phenotype was a posteriori in the genotype.”)

Learned Consciousness - for animals whose past experiences guide current choices (along with inherited experience). Conscious, but mostly habitual, reactions are developed through experience, including instruction by parents and peers.

Predictive Consciousness - A sequencer in the ERR system can play back beyond the current situation, allowing the organism to use imagination and foresight to evaluate the future consequences of its possible choices.

Reflective (Normative) Consciousness– in which conscious deliberation about individual values and the shared values of the species influences the choice of alternative behaviors.

The Two-Stage Model of Free Will

If we are determined, we are not free.
If our actions are random, we are not responsible.


Philosophers Think Free Will Acts at a Moment


The Temporal Sequence of first Free, then Will


Most philosophers and scientists are compatibilists, who want their actions to be caused by their reasons, motives, feelings, etc. and not be random. They think free will is compatible with determinism.

In the two-stage model, ontological chance or indeterminism of quantum mechanics is limited to the free generation of alternative possibilities.

In the second stage, the evaluation of alternatives is an adequately (statistically) determined process that leads to a willed act of self-determination.

This should be all that a compatibilist could want. It adds the fact that our actions are not pre-determined from moments before the decision process begins.

Downward Causation
Is it illogical to claim that biological information processing systems can have one-way causality?

The philosopher of mind Jaegwon Kim claims that the physical world is "causally closed," that the mind is epiphenomenal, that every mental event has a corresponding physical event that is the efficient cause of our actions. Mental events are redundant!

A study of the behavior of atoms and molecules in ribosomes in normal cells and in ion channels in neurons shows that semiotic information control flows only downward at the biological/chemical and mental/biological interfaces.

The lower level atoms and molecules are shown to be in thermal equilibrium. Their paths do not contain the information (Gibbs/Boltzmann “molecular order”) that would be needed for lower levels to be “in charge” of the upper levels. The intuitions of the emergentists are confirmed that biology cannot be reduced to chemistry and physics, nor can mind be reduced to the brain/body.

Biosemiotic control has one-way causality.

Ribosomes exercise "one-way" control, organizing molecules that are clearly in thermal equilibrium

Ion pumps pick out ions that are in thermal equilibrium

A Ribosome at the Biology/Matter Boundary

See The Cosmic Creation Process.

The twenty amino acids move about randomly in a cell, the consequence of thermal and quantum noise. Attached to them are tiny bits of transfer RNA, each with three letters of the genetic code that identify them. They bump randomly into the ribosome, which may be moving along a sequence of the genetic code written in the messenger RNA sent from the cell nucleus, signaling that more of a specific protein or enzyme is needed. The random motion shows us that no organized or coherent information is present in the unattached tRNAs that could cause something from the bottom up to control the higher level.

Notice the absurdity of the idea that the random motions of the transfer RNA molecules (green in the video), each holding a single amino acid (red), are carrying the pre-determined information about where they belong in the protein. Reductionism is nonsense.

It is the information processing of the higher-level ribosome that is in control. As the ribosome moves along the string of mRNA, it reads the next three-letter codon and waits for a tRNA with the matching anti-codon to collide randomly. With over 60 codons for the 20 amino acids, it might be some time before the desired amino acid shows up. Note that it is the high speed of the random thermal motions that allows this process to proceed rapidly.

An Ion Pump at the Mind/Brain Boundary

See The Cosmic Creation Process.

When a single neuron fires, the active potential rapidly changes the concentration of sodium (Na+) ions inside the cell and potassium (K+) ions outside the cell.

Within milliseconds, thousands of sodium-potassium ion transporters in the thin lipid bilayer of the cell wall must move billions of those ions, two or three at a time between inside and outside the cell wall, to get the neuron ready to fire again.

All the individual ions, atoms, and molecules in the cell are moving rapidly in random directions. The indeterministic motions of the ions randomly move some near the pump opening, where quantum collaborative forces can capture them in a lock-and-key structure. The idea that the physical/chemical base level contains enough information in the motion of its atoms and molecules to cause and explain the operations of the higher levels of life and mind is simply absurd.

The emergent biology of a sodium-potassium pump exerts downward causation on the ions, powered by ATP energy carriers (feeding on negative entropy).

The sodium-potassium pump in our neurons is as close to a Maxwell’s Demon as anything we are ever likely to see.

Biological Information Processing Turns Matter Into Life

When a ribosome assembles 330 amino acids in four symmetric polypeptide chains (globins), each globin traps an iron atom in a heme group at the center to form the hemoglobin protein. This is downward causal control of the amino acids, the heme groups, and the iron atoms by the ribosome. The ribosome is an example of Erwin Schrödinger's emergent "order out of order," life "feeding on the negative entropy" of digested food.

The random motions of the molecules in the cytosol insure that there is no organized "bottom-up" causation directing the ribosome.

Notice the absurdity of the idea that the random motions of the transfer RNA molecules (green in the video at right), each holding a single amino acid (red), are carrying pre-determined information of where they belong in the protein.

When 200 million of the 25 trillion red blood cells in the human body die each second, 100 million new hemoglobins must be assembled in each of 200 million new blood cells . With the order of a few thousand bytes of information in each hemoglobin, this is 10 thousand x 100 million x 200 million = 2 x 1020 bits of information per second, a million times more information processing than today's fastest computer CPU.

The ribosome is an information-processing biological system that has emerged from the lower level of chemistry and physics to exert downward causation on the atomic and molecular components needed to manufacture hemoglobin.

Claude Shannon's Communication of Information

Roman Jakobson's Communications Functions

Jakobson's work on communications functions appeared in Thomas Sebeok's 1960 book, Style in Language.

Writing about ten years after Claude Shannon, and making no specific reference to his theory of the communication of information, Jakobson's diagrams clearly reflect Shannon's influence. Jakobson distinguished six communication functions, each associated with a dimension or factor of the communication process.

Context was perhaps Jakobson's most important addition to semiotics. Adding context gives us the difference between semantics (the standard dictionary meaning of a word according to the normal "rules" of the language) versus pragmatics, the meaning that may be intended by the sender, or should be inferred by the receiver/interpreter because of the current situation. Jakobson calls this contextual information "denotative," "cognitive," "referential," the "leading task" of a message. Context-dependence alters the "meaning" to suit the purpose of a communication.

Notes:

  1. referential (: the denotative or connotative "aboutness," contextual information, the "third person," someone or something the message is about)
  2. aesthetic/poetic (: information )
  3. emotive (: the addressee's self-expression, attitude, intention, first person)
  4. conative (: vocative or imperative addressing of receiver, second person)
  5. phatic (: no information, checking channel working, are you still there?)
  6. metalingual (: "about" the language itself, checking code working, agreement on the meanings of words)

Jakobson's famous but mysterious dictum "the poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection to the axis of combination" presages the fall of Saussure's synchronic, time-independent structuralism to the post-structuralist and post-modernist diachronic view, notably Jacques Derrida's "différance" whose meaning of deferral can only be seen and not heard, to displace the Platonic privileging of voice over text.

Derrida showed that meaning is deferred, disseminated, that Saussure's claim that meaning is "différence" is not the whole story. And Roland Barthes showed the dyadic Saussurean s/S becomes the "circle of signifiers" s/Z if one is trapped in Jakobson's "selection axis" of looking up words in a dictionary of dead (non-evolving) languages.

Umberto Eco's Communications Model

In his book, A Theory of Semiotics, written between 1967 and 1974, Umberto Eco rewrote the "usual communications model" as above (p.141), with strong influences from Claude Shannon and possibly Roman Jakobson.

He wrote:

The information of the message is only reduced by the addressee when he selects a definite interpretation.
He also wrote a paradoxical example of the problem facing the interpretant:
i vitelli dei romani sono belli
"Go Vitellius, to the sound of war of the Roman gods?"
"The lambs of the Romans are beautiful?"

Charles Sanders Peirce's Theory of Semiotics

Three Worlds

A Biosemiotic Flow Chart

Concepts and Percepts (without Objects)

Immanuel Kant wrote this famous chiasmos (figure of speech)

Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer.
Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.
KrV B 75.16. Note that Kant had earlier (B 74.19) used "Begriffe ohne Anschauungen" so his chiasmos might have
been symmetric before Peirce. His "ohne Inhalt" is unfortunate. Everything without content is empty!

Charles Sanders Peirce adapted this for a beautifully symmetric chiasmos about the fundamental dualism.

If Materialism without Idealism is blind,
Idealism without Materialism is void.

With a nod to Kant and Peirce, we can say

Kantcepts without Peircepts are empty.
Peircepts without Kantcepts are blind.

And although Freedom and Values are not a dualism, they too require one another and we can observe,

Freedom without Values is Absurd (Continental Existentialism).
Values without Freedom are Worthless (British Utilitarianism).


Link to this presentation: http://informationphilosopher.com/presentations/Biosemiotics/

Email me: BobDoyle@InformationPhilosopher.com or rodoyle@fas.harvard.edu

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