She works at the intersection of metaphysics, the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of mind and action, convinced that bringing together these fields is indispensable for tackling many of the big questions of philosophy.

She co-edited with Dupré Biological Identity: Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Biology, published by Routledge, 2020. They co-wrote the introductory article "Why Metaphysicians and Philosophers of Biology Should Talk to One Another."

Comparing the perspectives on biological identity in metaphysics and the philosophy of biology, we thus find a striking tension: while Aristotle-inspired metaphysicians tend to be confident that biological identity is a robust part of reality on which we can rely to solve longstanding metaphysical problems such as those of personal identity and material constitution, philosophers of biology, engaging with the latest research in biology, have unveiled the manifold and intricate challenges for a satisfying account of biological identity – challenges that may well make one wonder if there is such a thing as biological identity at all.

Biological Identity, p.3

The volume concludes with chapter 14 by Meincke called "Processual Animalism" in which she argues for

a version of animalism that is based on the view that organisms are (continuant) processes. This proposal is motivated by the critical diagnosis that the animalist understanding of the key notion of biological identity is in conflict with our best contemporary science. Meincke shows this with respect to the two criteria of biological identity through time proposed by the animalists Eric T. Olson and Peter van Inwagen, the Biological Continuity Criterion and the Life Criterion. The former proves unable to handle branching cases, such as the case of monozygotic twinning, prompting empirically questionable ad-hoc claims, while the latter invokes an empirically implausible view of a biological life as a well-individuated event. Meincke further argues that these difficulties have their ultimate roots in the thing ontological framework presupposed by animalism, and suggests that animalism adopt a (non-fourdimensionalist) process ontological framework instead.

Animalism is the view that we are biological beings, i.e., organisms or animals, and have biological persistence conditions. Personal identity, properly understood, is biological identity. In this chapter, I discuss this core animalist tenet, arguing for three claims: (i) the Harmless Claim: animalism has not yet sufficiently explicated its key notion of biological identity; (ii) the Not-so-harmless Claim: a large part of what animalists do say about biological identity is in tension with what biologists and philosophers of biology say about biological identity; (iii) the Radical Claim: animalism cannot provide a convincing account of personal identity so long as the notion of biological identity employed is based on the metaphysical assumption that organisms are substances or things composed of (smaller) things. I argue that only processual animalism which recognises organisms as processes can deliver a truly convincing account of biological and, hence, personal identity, thus overcoming a characteristic dilemma faced by psychological accounts of personal identity, rather than repeating it.

According to the Biological Continuity Criterion, biological continuity is necessary and sufficient for biological identity in the sense of numerical identity. However, this leads to contradiction in the branching case: since both twins are biologically continuous with the original zygote, we would have to conclude that both are numerically identical with it, from which, per transitivity of the relation of numerical identity, we would further have to infer that both twins are numerically identical with one another.

This numerical identity is similar to Max Black's famous article "The identity of Indiscernables" (Mind 61: 153-64)

In information philosophy, identity depends on the total information associated with an object or concept. We distinguish the intrinsic information inside the object (or concept) from any relational information with respect to other objects that we call extrinsic or external. We can "pick out" the intrinsic information as that which is "self-identical" in an object. The Greeks called this the πρὸς ἑαυτο - self-relation. or ἰδίος ποιὸν, "peculiar qualifications" of the individual.

Self-identity, then, is the simple fact that the intrinsic information and the extrinsic relational or dispositional information are unique to this single object. No other object can have the same disposition relative to other objects. Some metaphysicians say that such identity is logically necessary. Some say self-identity is the only identity, but we can now support philosophers who argue for a relative identity, such as David Wiggins.

In Meincke's example, any intrinsic difference between the two zygotes is initially "indiscernible." But even at their creation they occupy different places in the uterus, so their extrinsic information is initially different. And even their intrinsic information will rapidly diverge as the embryos grow, "passing through different developmental stages: morula, blastula, gastrula, and so on.," as Meincke notes.

Please see metaphysicist.com/problems/identity/ for further details.