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Core Concepts

Adequate Determinism
Alternative Possibilities
Causa sui
Causality
Certainty
Chance
Chance Not Direct Cause
The Cogito Model
Compatibilism
Conceptual Analysis
Control
Could Do Otherwise
Creativity
De-liberation
Determinism
Disambiguation
Ethical Fallacy
"Free Will"
Free Will Mechanisms
Free Will Requirements
Future Contingency
Hard Incompatibilism
Illusionism
Impossibilism
Incompatibilism
Indeterminacy
Indeterminism
Libertarianism
Liberty of Indifference
Luck
Moral Responsibility
Moral Sentiments
Naturalism
Necessity
Predictability
Probability
Pseudo-Problem
Random When?/Where?
Rational Fallacy
Responsibility
Same Circumstances
Second Thoughts
Semicompatibilism
Soft Causality
Standard Argument
Temporal Sequence
Two-Stage Models
Uncertainty
Up To Us

Philosophers

Mortimer Adler
G.E.M.Anscombe
Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
Augustine
A.J.Ayer
Mark Balaguer
Isaiah Berlin
Susanne Bobzien
George Boole
F.H.Bradley
C.D.Broad
C.A.Campbell
Joseph Keim Campbell
Ernst Cassirer
Roderick Chisholm
Chrysippus
Cicero
Randolph Clarke
Donald Davidson
Democritus
Daniel Dennett
René Descartes
Richard Double
John Earman
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Epictetus
Epicurus
John Martin Fischer
Philippa Foot
Alfred Fouilleé
Harry Frankfurt
Richard L. Franklin
Carl Ginet
Ian Hacking
Ishtiyaque Haji
Stuart Hampshire
Georg W.F. Hegel
Martin Heidegger
R.E.Hobart
Thomas Hobbes
David Hodgson
Shadsworth Hodgson
Ted Honderich
David Hume
William James
Robert Kane
Tomis Kapitan
Immanuel Kant
Keith Lehrer
Gottfried Leibniz
David Lewis
John Locke
John R. Lucas
Lucretius
Hugh McCann
Colin McGinn
Michael McKenna
Alfred Mele
John Stuart Mill
Dickinson Miller
G.E.Moore
Thomas Nagel
Friedrich Nietzsche
P.H.Nowell-Smith
Robert Nozick
William of Ockham
Timothy O'Connor
Charles Sanders Peirce
Derk Pereboom
Steven Pinker
Karl Popper
Willard van Orman Quine
Ayn Rand
Thomas Reid
Charles Renouvier
Josiah Royce
Bertrand Russell
Paul Russell
Gilbert Ryle
Moritz Schlick
Arthur Schopenhauer
John Searle
Henry Sidgwick
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
J.J.C.Smart
Saul Smilansky
Galen Strawson
Peter Strawson
Eleonore Stump
Richard Taylor
Kevin Timpe
Peter van Inwagen
Manuel Vargas
John Venn
Kadri Vihvelin
G.H. von Wright
R. Jay Wallace
Ted Warfield
Roy Weatherford
Alfred North Whitehead
David Widerker
David Wiggins
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Susan Wolf

Scientists

Neils Bohr
Ludwig Boltzmann
Max Born
Stephen Brush
Arthur Holly Compton
Abraham de Moivre
John Eccles
Arthur Stanley Eddington
Albert Einstein
Richard Feynman
A.O.Gomes
Joshua Greene
Martin Heisenberg
Werner Heisenberg
Pierre-Simon Laplace
David Layzer
Henry Margenau
James Clerk Maxwell
Steven Pinker
Max Planck
Henri Poincaré
Erwin Schrödinger
William Thomson (Kelvin)
John von Neumann
Daniel Wegner

 
Determinism
Determinism as a theory is supported by a majority of philosophers, each with special vested interests in one or more of the many determinisms.
Compatibilism is a form of determinism that argues man is free as long as his own will is one of the steps in the causal chain, even if his choices are completely predetermined for physical reasons or preordained by God.
And Fatalism is a special form of determinism where every event in the future is fated to happen. Fatalism does not imply that any causal laws or higher powers are involved. Que sera, sera.
The core idea of determinism is closely related to the idea of causality. But we can have causality without determinism.
Despite David Hume's critical attack on the necessity of causes, many philosophers embrace causality and determinism strongly. Some even connect it to the very possibility of logic and reason. And Hume himself believed strongly, if inconsistently, in necessity. " 'tis impossible to admit any medium betwixt chance and necessity," he said.
Bertrand Russell said "The law of causation, according to which later events can theoretically be predicted by means of earlier events, has often been held to be a priori, a necessity of thought, a category without which science would not be possible." (Russell, External World p.179)
The core idea of indeterminism is closely related to the idea of causality. Indeterminism for some is simply an event without a cause. But we can have an adequate causality without strict determinism, which otherwise implies complete predictability of events and only one possible future.
An example of an event that is not strictly caused is one that depends on chance, like the flip of a coin. If the outcome is only probable, not certain, then the event can be said to have been caused by the coin flip, but the head or tails result itself was not predictable. So this causality, which recognizes prior events as causes, is undetermined and the result of chance alone.
We call this "soft" causality. Events are caused by prior (uncaused) events, but not determined by events earlier in the causal chain, which has been broken by the uncaused cause.
Determinism is critical for the question of free will. Strict determinism implies just one possible future. Chance means that the future is unpredictable. Chance allows alternative futures and the question becomes how the one actual present is realized from these potential alternatives.
The departure required from strict determinism is very slight compared to the miraculous ideas associated with the "causa sui" (self-caused cause) of the ancients.
Even in a world that contains quantum uncertainty, macroscopic objects are determined to an extraordinary degree. Newton's laws of motion are deterministic enough to send men to the moon and back. Our Cogito model of the Macro Mind is large enough to ignore quantum uncertainty for the purpose of the reasoning will. The neural system is robust enough to insure that mental decisions are reliably transmitted to our limbs.
we see a world of
soft causality and adequate determinism
We call this determinism, only ineffective for extremely small structures, "adequate determinism." Determinism is adequate enough for us to predict eclipses for the next thousand years or more with extraordinary precision.
Belief in strict determinism, in the face of physical evidence for indeterminism, is only tenable today for dogmatic philosophy. We survey ten modern dogmas of determinism.
The presence of quantum uncertainty leads some philosophers to call the world indetermined. But indeterminism is somewhat misleading, with strong negative connotations, when most events are overwhelmingly "adequately determined." Nevertheless, speaking logically, if a single event is undetermined, then indeterminism is true, and determinism false. 1
There is no problem imagining that the three traditional mental faculties of reason - perception, conception, and comprehension - are all carried on deterministically in a physical brain where quantum events do not interfere with normal operations.
There is also no problem imagining a role for randomness in the brain in the form of quantum level noise. Noise can introduce random errors into stored memories. Noise could create random associations of ideas during memory recall. This randomness may be driven by microscopic fluctuations that are amplified to the macroscopic level.
Our Macro Mind needs the Micro Mind for the free action items and thoughts in an Agenda of alternative possibilities to be de-liberated by the will. The random Micro Mind is the "free" in free will and the source of human creativity. http://www.informationphilosopher.com/timelines/PageWriter.htmlThe adequately determined Macro Mind is the "will" in free will that de-liberates, choosing actions for which we can be morally responsible.
Determinism must be disambiguated from its close relatives causality, certainty, necessity, and predictability.
For Teachers
C.D.Broad, in 1932, defined Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism. Reprinted in Morgenbesser (1962) Free Will
And now at last we can define- "determinism" and "indeterminism." Determinism is the doctrine that every event is completely determined, in the sense just defined. Indeterminism, is the doctrine that some, and it may be all, events are not completely determined, in the sense defined. Both doctrines are, prima facie, intelligible, when defined as I have defined them.

There is one other point to be noticed. An event might be completely determined, and yet it might have a "causal ancestor" which was not, completely determined. If Y is the total cause of Z and X is the total cause of Y, I call both Y and X "causal ancestors" of Z. Similarly, if W were the total cause of X, I should call Y, X, and W "causal ancestors" of Z. And so on. If at any stage in such a series there is a term, e.g. W, which contains a cause-factor that is not completely determined, the series will stop there, just as the series of human ancestors stops with Adam. Such a term may be called the "causal progenitor" of such a series. If determinism be true, every event has causal ancestors, and therefore there are no causal progenitors. If indeterminism be true, there are causal progenitors in the history of the world.

We are now in a position to define what Ι will call "libertarianism." This doctrine may be summed up in two propositions. (i) Some (and it may be all) voluntary actions have a causal ancestor which contains as a cause factor the putting-forth of an effort which is not completely determined in direction and intensity by occurrent causation. (ii) In such cases the direction and the intensity of the effort are completely determined by non-occurrent causation, in which the self or agent, taken as a substance or continuant, is the non-occurrent total cause. [Broad means a non-physical mind as the non-occurent cause.] Thus, Libertarianism, as defined by me, entails indeterminism, as defined by me; but the converse does not hold.

If I am right, libertarianism is self-evidently impossible, whilst indeterminism is prima facie possible.

Richard Double, in his The Non-Reality of Free Will (1995?) provided these definitions.
Although the notion of determinism appears frequently through this book, the free will discussion is concerned only with a tiny subset of what might be determined, viz., those events that affect human decision making. Whether there is, e.g., indeterminacy in quantum physics is an empirical matter outside of philosophers' ken and, by itself, does not bear on the free will debate, although some libertarians have argued that quantum indeterminacy could bear on human choices (see Chapter 8). This book is primarily about free will, though, and about determinism only incidentally.

Compatibilism — The view that the theses of free will and determinism can both be true.

Incompatibilism — The view that they cannot both be true.

Soft determinism — Technically, compatibilism plus the belief in determinism, but in fact, the view that we have free will not as a result of indeterminism, whether or not determinism is true.

Hard determinism — Technically, incompatibilism plus determinism, but in fact, the view that humans lack free will because their decisions are determined, again, whether or not determinism in its fullest generality is true.

Libertarianism — The view that humans have free will as a result of indeterminism in their choices.

For Scholars
1. C.D.Broad, 1934 "Indeterminism, is the doctrine that some, and it may be all, events are not completely determined."

Chapter 1.4 - Philosophy Chapter 2.2 - The History of Free Will
Part One - Introduction Part Three - Value
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