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Core Concepts

Adequate Determinism
Agent-Causality
Alternative Possibilities
Causa Sui
Causality
Certainty
Chance
Chance Not Direct Cause
The Cogito Model
Compatibilism
Conceptual Analysis
Control
Could Do Otherwise
Creativity
De-liberation
Determination
Determination Fallacy
Determinism
Disambiguation
Either Way
Ethical Fallacy
Extreme Libertarianism
Event Has Many Causes
Free Choice
Freedom of Action
"Free Will"
Free Will in Antiquity
Free Will Mechanisms
Free Will Requirements
Free Will Theorem
Future Contingency
Hard Incompatibilism
Illusion of Determinism
Illusionism
Impossibilism
Incompatibilism
Indeterminacy
Indeterminism
Infinities
Libertarianism
Liberty of Indifference
Luck
Modest Libertarianism
Moral Responsibility
Moral Sentiments
Mysteries
Naturalism
Necessity
Noise
Non-Causality
Pre-determinism
Predictability
Probability
Pseudo-Problem
Random When?/Where?
Rational Fallacy
Responsibility
Same Circumstances
Science Advance Fallacy
Second Thoughts
Semicompatibilism
Soft Causality
Standard Argument
Temporal Sequence
Tertium Quid
Torn Decision
Two-Stage Models
Ultimate Responsibility
Uncertainty
Up To Us

Philosophers

Mortimer Adler
Rogers Albritton
Alexander of Aphrodisias
G.E.M.Anscombe
Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
David Armstrong
Augustine
A.J.Ayer
Mark Balaguer
William Belsham
Henri Bergson
Isaiah Berlin
Bernard Berofsky
Susanne Bobzien
George Boole
Émile Boutroux
F.H.Bradley
C.D.Broad
C.A.Campbell
Joseph Keim Campbell
Carneades
Ernst Cassirer
Roderick Chisholm
Chrysippus
Cicero
Randolph Clarke
Donald Davidson
Democritus
Daniel Dennett
René Descartes
Richard Double
Fred Dretske
John Earman
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Epictetus
Epicurus
John Martin Fischer
Owen Flanagan
Philippa Foot
Alfred Fouillée
Harry Frankfurt
Richard L. Franklin
Carl Ginet
Nicholas St. John Green
Ian Hacking
Ishtiyaque Haji
Stuart Hampshire
Georg W.F. Hegel
Martin Heidegger
R.E.Hobart
Thomas Hobbes
David Hodgson
Shadsworth Hodgson
Ted Honderich
Pamela Huby
David Hume
William James
Robert Kane
Immanuel Kant
Tomis Kapitan
Christine Korsgaard
Keith Lehrer
Gottfried Leibniz
Leucippus
C.I.Lewis
David Lewis
Peter Lipton
John Locke
John R. Lucas
Lucretius
Hugh McCann
Colin McGinn
Michael McKenna
Alfred Mele
John Stuart Mill
Dickinson Miller
G.E.Moore
Thomas Nagel
Friedrich Nietzsche
P.H.Nowell-Smith
Robert Nozick
William of Ockham
Timothy O'Connor
Charles Sanders Peirce
Derk Pereboom
Steven Pinker
Karl Popper
H.A.Prichard
Hilary Putnam
Willard van Orman Quine
Frank Ramsey
Ayn Rand
Thomas Reid
Charles Renouvier
Nicholas Rescher
C.W.Rietdijk
Josiah Royce
Bertrand Russell
Paul Russell
Gilbert Ryle
T.M.Scanlon
Moritz Schlick
Arthur Schopenhauer
John Searle
Henry Sidgwick
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
J.J.C.Smart
Saul Smilansky
Michael Smith
L. Susan Stebbing
Galen Strawson
Peter Strawson
Eleonore Stump
Richard Taylor
Kevin Timpe
Peter van Inwagen
Manuel Vargas
John Venn
Kadri Vihvelin
Voltaire
G.H. von Wright
R. Jay Wallace
Ted Warfield
Roy Weatherford
Alfred North Whitehead
David Widerker
David Wiggins
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Susan Wolf

Scientists

Michael Arbib
Bernard Baars
John S. Bell
Charles Bennett
Margaret Boden
David Bohm
Neils Bohr
Ludwig Boltzmann
Max Born
Stephen Brush
Leon Brillouin
Thomas Buckle
Anthony Cashmore
Arthur Holly Compton
Abraham de Moivre
Paul Dirac
John Eccles
Arthur Stanley Eddington
Albert Einstein
Richard Feynman
GianCarlo Ghirardi
Nicolas Gisin
A.O.Gomes
Joshua Greene
Jacques Hadamard
Martin Heisenberg
Werner Heisenberg
Pascual Jordan
Simon Kochen
Stephen Kosslyn
Rolf Landauer
Alfred Landé
Pierre-Simon Laplace
David Layzer
Benjamin Libet
Josef Loschmidt
Ernst Mach
Henry Margenau
James Clerk Maxwell
Ernst Mayr
Jacques Monod
Roger Penrose
Steven Pinker
Max Planck
Henri Poincaré
Adolphe Quételet
Jerome Rothstein
Erwin Schrödinger
Claude Shannon
Herbert Simon
B. F. Skinner
Antoine Suarez
Leo Szilard
William Thomson (Kelvin)
John von Neumann
Daniel Wegner
Steven Weinberg
Norbert Wiener
Eugene Wigner
E. O. Wilson
Ernst Zermelo

 
Control
Control is the idea that our decisions are up to us.
If we lack control - because our decisions were pre-determined, or they are undetermined or random - then we would not have the accountability for our decisions that is required for moral responsibility.

John Martin Fischer has separated the idea of control into two kinds. The first he calls "legislative control" - the kind needed to choose between alternative possibilities. The second he calls "guidance control" - the kind of control needed to initiate or originate an action, by being "reasons responsive" and taking ownership of the action, meaning the agent can say the action was "up to me."

Since we first need free (alternative possibilities) and then will (adequately determined actions) in a temporal_sequence - first chance, then choice - we can distinguish the amount of control we have at these two stages in the process of "free will."

As the earliest libertarian philosophers like Lucretius knew, and as the great John Locke told us, we need to unpack the concept "free will" into two separate concepts, "free" and "will," in a temporal_sequence.

In the first "free" stage, the development of creative alternative possibilities for thought and action, our control is probably minimal. Random thoughts appear to "come to us," more than "from us."

These thoughts may be our own, remembrances of past experiences or ideas that are relevant to the current situation. But they also may be random variations of past experiences and contain many immediate sensory inputs we can not control that suggest new possibilities to us.

Random alternatives may be generated internal to our minds or come into us from external events that are random and outside our control. Nevertheless, we may have some control over the time we allow our minds to consider new possibilities.

In the second "will" stage, the de-liberation and evaluation of alternative possibilities, we want enough control to say that our decisions are adequately determined to be consistent with our character and values.

This does not mean we are determined to select from the current possibilities which were randomly generated. If they do not seem good enough in our judgment, we have enough control to send them back for further generation of possible thoughts or actions.

Our desires, intentions, decisions, and actions all appear to "come from us." We feel we control them because they "depend on us."

Our Thoughts are Free.
They come to us.

Our Actions are Willed.
They come from us.

Control over the generation of new ideas
A final control requirement is that the mind must be able to suppress random noise when it is only interfering with thought, but recruit it when new alternatives are needed for action options, or solving problems, or being creative.
For Teachers
For Scholars

Chapter 3.7 - The Ergod Chapter 4.2 - The History of Free Will
Part Three - Value Part Five - Problems
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