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John Stewart Bell
In 1964 John Bell showed how the 1935 "thought experiments" of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) could be made into real experiments. He put limits on local "hidden variables" that might restore a deterministic physics in the form of what he called an "inequality," the violation of which would confirm standard quantum mechanics.
Some thinkers, mostly philosophers of science rather than working quantum physicists, think that Bell's work has restored the determinism in physics that Einstein had wanted and that Bell recovered the "local elements of reality" that Einstein hoped for.
But Bell himself came to the conclusion that local "hidden variables" will never be found that give the same results as quantum mechanics. This has come to be known as Bell's Theorem.
All theories that reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics will be "nonlocal," Bell concluded. Nonlocality is an element of physical reality and it has produced some remarkable new applications of quantum physics, including quantum cryptography and quantum computing.
Bell based his idea of real experiments on the 1952 work of David Bohm. Bohm proposed an improvement on the original EPR experiment that measured position and momentum. Bohm's model postulates (undetectable) deterministic positions and trajectories for atomic particles, but it is still a "nonlocal" theory where the instantaneous collapse happens in a new "quantum potential" field that can move faster than light speed.
So Bohm (and Bell) believed that nonlocal "hidden variables" might exist, and that some form of information could come into existence at remote "space-like separations" at speeds faster then light, if not instantaneously.
The original EPR paper was based on a question of Einstein's about two electrons fired in opposite directions from a central source with equal velocities. He imagined them starting from a distance at t0 and approaching one another with high velocities, then for a short time interval from t1 to t1 + Δt in contact with one another, where experimental measurements could be made on the momenta, after which they separate. Now at a later time t2 it would be possible to make a measurement of electron 1's position and would therefore know the position of electron 2 without measuring it explicitly.
Einstein used the conservation of linear momentum to "know" the symmetric position of the other electron. This knowledge implies information about the remote electron that is available instantly. Einstein called this "spooky action-at-a-distance."
Bohm's experiment used two electrons that are prepared in an initial state of known total spin. If one electron spin is 1/2 in the up direction and the other is spin down or -1/2, the total spin is zero. The underlying physical law of importance is still a conservation law, in this case the conservation of angular momentum. If electron 1 is spin down and electron 2 is spin up, the total angular momentum is also zero.
The paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen was advanced as a argument that quantum mechanics could not be a complete theory but should be supplemented by additional variables. These additional variables were to restore to the theory causality and locality. In this note that idea will be formulated mathematically and shown to be incompatible with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. It is the requirement of locality, or more precisely that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past, that creates the essential difficulty. There have been attempts to show that even without such a separability or locality requirement no 'hidden variable' interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible. These attempts have been examined [by Bell] elsewhere and found wanting. Moreover, a hidden variable interpretation of elementary quantum theory has been explicitly constructed [by Bohm]. That particular interpretation has indeed a gross non-local structure. This is characteristic, according to the result to be proved here, of any such theory which reproduces exactly the quantum mechanical predictions. With the example advocated by Bohm and Aharonov, the EPR argument is the following. Consider a pair of spin one-half particles formed somehow in the singlet spin state and moving freely in opposite directions. Measurements can be made, say by Stern—Gerlach magnets, on selected components of the spins σ1 and σ2. If measurement of the component σ1 • a, where a is some unit vector, yields the value + 1 then, according to quantum mechanics, measurement of σ2 • a must yield the value — 1 and vice versa. Now we make the hypothesis, and it seems one at least worth considering, that if the two measurements are made at places remote from one another the orientation of one magnet does not influence the result obtained with the other.Just a year before Bell's death in 1990, physicists assembled for a conference on 62 Years of Uncertainty (referring to Werner Heisenberg's 1927 principle of indeterminacy). John Bell's contribution to the conference was an article called "Against Measurement." In it he attacked Max Born's statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics. And he praised the new ideas of GianCarlo Ghirardi and his colleagues, Alberto Rimini and Tomaso Weber: In the beginning, Schrödinger tried to interpret his wavefunction as giving somehow the density of the stuff of which the world is made. He tried to think of an electron as represented by a wavepacket — a wave-function appreciably different from zero only over a small region in space. The extension of that region he thought of as the actual size of the electron — his electron was a bit fuzzy. At first he thought that small wavepackets, evolving according to the Schrödinger equation, would remain small. But that was wrong. Wavepackets diffuse, and with the passage of time become indefinitely extended, according to the Schrödinger equation. But however far the wavefunction has extended, the reaction of a detector to an electron remains spotty. So Schrödinger's 'realistic' interpretation of his wavefunction did not survive. Then came the Born interpretation. The wavefunction gives not the density of stuff, but gives rather (on squaring its modulus) the density of probability. Probability of what exactly? Not of the electron being there, but of the electron being found there, if its position is 'measured*. Why this aversion to 'being' and insistence on 'finding'? The founding fathers were unable to form a clear picture of things on the remote atomic scale. They became very aware of the intervening apparatus, and of the need for a 'classical' base from which to intervene on the quantum system. And so the shifty split. The kinematics of the world, in this orthodox picture, is given a wavefunction (maybe more than one?) for the quantum part, and classical variables — variables which have values — for the classical part: (Ψ(t, q, ...), X(t),...). The Xs are somehow macroscopic. This is not spelled out very explicitly. The dynamics is not very precisely formulated either. It includes a Schrödinger equation for the quantum part, and some sort of classical mechanics for the classical part, and 'collapse' recipes for their interaction. It seems to me that the only hope of precision with the dual (Ψ, x) kinematics is to omit completely the shifty split, and let both Ψ and x refer to the world as a whole. Then the xs must not be confined to some vague macroscopic scale, but must extend to all scales. In the picture of de Broglie and Bohm, every particle is attributed a position x(t). Then instrument pointers — assemblies of particles have positions, and experiments have results. The dynamics is given by the world Schrödinger equation plus precise 'guiding' equations prescribing how the x(t)s move under the influence of Ψ. Particles are not attributed angular momenta, energies, etc., but only positions as functions of time. Peculiar 'measurement' results for angular momenta, energies, and so on, emerge as pointer positions in appropriate experimental setups. Considerations of KG [Kurt Gottfried] and vK [N. G. van Kampen] type, on the absence (FAPP) [For All Practical Purposes] of macroscopic interference, take their place here, and an important one, in showing how usually we do not have (FAPP) to pay attention to the whole world, but only to some subsystem and can simplify the wave-function... FAPP. The Born-type kinematics (Ψ, X) has a duality that the original 'density of stuff' picture of Schrödinger did not. The position of the particle there was just a feature of the wavepacket, not something in addition. The Landau—Lifshitz approach can be seen as maintaining this simple non-dual kinematics, but with the wavefunction compact on a macroscopic rather than microscopic scale. We know, they seem to say, that macroscopic pointers have definite positions. And we think there is nothing but the wavefunction. So the wavefunction must be narrow as regards macroscopic variables. The Schrödinger equation does not preserve such narrowness (as Schrödinger himself dramatised with his cat). So there must be some kind of 'collapse' going on in addition, to enforce macroscopic narrowness. In the same way, if we had modified Schrödinger's evolution somehow we might have prevented the spreading of his wavepacket electrons. But actually the idea that an electron in a ground-state hydrogen atom is as big as the atom (which is then perfectly spherical) is perfectly tolerable — and maybe even attractive. The idea that a macroscopic pointer can point simultaneously in different directions, or that a cat can have several of its nine lives at the same time, is harder to swallow. And if we have no extra variables X to express macroscopic definiteness, the wavefunction itself must be narrow in macroscopic directions in the configuration space. This the Landau—Lifshitz collapse brings about. It does so in a rather vague way, at rather vaguely specified times. In the Ghirardi—Rimini—Weber scheme (see the contributions of Ghirardi, Rimini, Weber, Pearle, Gisin and Diosi presented at 62 Years of Uncertainty, Erice, 5-14 August 1989) this vagueness is replaced by mathematical precision. The Schrödinger wavefunction even for a single particle, is supposed to be unstable, with a prescribed mean life per particle, against spontaneous collapse of a prescribed form. The lifetime and collapsed extension are such that departures of the Schrödinger equation show up very rarely and very weakly in few-particle systems. But in macroscopic systems, as a consequence of the prescribed equations, pointers very rapidly point, and cats are very quickly killed or spared. The orthodox approaches, whether the authors think they have made derivations or assumptions, are just fine FAPP — when used with the good taste and discretion picked up from exposure to good examples. At least two roads are open from there towards a precise theory, it seems to me. Both eliminate the shifty split. The de Broglie—Bohm-type theories retain, exactly, the linear wave equation, and so necessarily add complementary variables to express the non-waviness of the world on the macroscopic scale. The GRW-type theories have nothing in the kinematics but the wavefunction. It gives the density (in a multidimensional configuration space!) of stuff. To account for the narrowness of that stuff in macroscopic dimensions, the linear Schrödinger equation has to be modified, in this GRW picture by a mathematically prescribed spontaneous collapse mechanism. The big question, in my opinion, is which, if either, of these two precise pictures can be redeveloped in a Lorentz invariant way.On the 22nd of January 1990, Bell gave a talk explaining his theorem at CERN in Geneva...All historical experience confirms that men might not achieve the possible if they had not, time and time again, reached out for the impossible. (Max Weber) ...we do not know where we are stupid until we stick our necks out. (R. P. Feynman) organized by Antoine Suarez, director of the Center for Quantum Philosophy. There are links on the CERN website to the video of this talk, and to a transcription. In this talk, Bell summarizes the situation as follows: It just is a fact that quantum mechanical predictions and experiments, in so far as they have been done, do not agree with [my] inequality. And that's just a brutal fact of nature...that's just the fact of the situation; the Einstein program fails, that's too bad for Einstein, but should we worry about that? I cannot say that action at a distance is required in physics. But I can say that you cannot get away with no action at a distance. You cannot separate off what happens in one place and what happens in another. Somehow they have to be described and explained jointly. Well, that's just the fact of the situation; the Einstein program fails, that's too bad for Einstein, but should we worry about that?Bell gives three reasons for not worrying.
So as a solution of this situation, I think we cannot just say 'Oh oh, nature is not like that.' I think you must find a picture in which perfect correlations are natural, without implying determinism, because that leads you back to nonlocality. And also in this independence as far as our individual experiences goes, our independence of the rest of the world is also natural. So the connections have to be very subtle, and I have told you all that I know about them. Thank you.Since Bell's original work, many other physicists have defined other "Bell inequalities" and developed increasingly sophisticated experiments to test them. Most tests have used oppositely polarized photons coming from a central source. Again, a total photon spin of zero is conserved.
In the information physics solution to the problem of measurement, the timing and location of Bell's "shifty split" (the "cut" or "Schnitt" of Heisenberg and von Neumann) are identified with the interaction between quantum system and classical apparatus that leaves the apparatus in an irreversible stable state providing information to the observer. For Teachers
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