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Philosophers
Mortimer Adler Rogers Albritton Alexander of Aphrodisias G.E.M.Anscombe Anselm Thomas Aquinas Aristotle David Armstrong Augustine J.L.Austin A.J.Ayer Alexander Bain Mark Balaguer William Belsham Henri Bergson Isaiah Berlin Bernard Berofsky Susanne Bobzien Emil du Bois-Reymond George Boole Émile Boutroux F.H.Bradley C.D.Broad C.A.Campbell Joseph Keim Campbell Carneades Ernst Cassirer Roderick Chisholm Chrysippus Cicero Randolph Clarke Samuel Clarke Anthony Collins Diodorus Cronus Donald Davidson Democritus Daniel Dennett René Descartes Richard Double Fred Dretske John Earman Laura Waddell Ekstrom Epictetus Epicurus Herbert Feigl John Martin Fischer Owen Flanagan Luciano Floridi Philippa Foot Alfred Fouilleé Harry Frankfurt Richard L. Franklin Michael Frede Carl Ginet Nicholas St. John Green H.Paul Grice Ian Hacking Ishtiyaque Haji Stuart Hampshire W.F.R.Hardie R.M.Hare Georg W.F. Hegel Martin Heidegger R.E.Hobart Thomas Hobbes David Hodgson Shadsworth Hodgson Ted Honderich Pamela Huby David Hume Ferenc Huoranszki William James Lord Kames Robert Kane Immanuel Kant Tomis Kapitan William King Christine Korsgaard Keith Lehrer Gottfried Leibniz Leucippus Michael Levin C.I.Lewis David Lewis Peter Lipton John Locke Michael Lockwood John R. Lucas Lucretius James Martineau Hugh McCann Colin McGinn Michael McKenna Paul E. Meehl Alfred Mele John Stuart Mill Dickinson Miller G.E.Moore Thomas Nagel Friedrich Nietzsche P.H.Nowell-Smith Robert Nozick William of Ockham Timothy O'Connor David F. Pears Charles Sanders Peirce Derk Pereboom Steven Pinker Plato Karl Popper H.A.Prichard Hilary Putnam Willard van Orman Quine Frank Ramsey Ayn Rand Thomas Reid Charles Renouvier Nicholas Rescher C.W.Rietdijk Josiah Royce Bertrand Russell Paul Russell Gilbert Ryle T.M.Scanlon Moritz Schlick Arthur Schopenhauer John Searle Wilfrid Sellars Henry Sidgwick Walter Sinnott-Armstrong J.J.C.Smart Saul Smilansky Michael Smith L. Susan Stebbing George F. Stout Galen Strawson Peter Strawson Eleonore Stump Richard Taylor Kevin Timpe Peter van Inwagen Manuel Vargas John Venn Kadri Vihvelin Voltaire G.H. von Wright David Foster Wallace R. Jay Wallace W.G.Ward Ted Warfield Roy Weatherford Alfred North Whitehead David Widerker David Wiggins Bernard Williams Ludwig Wittgenstein Susan Wolf Scientists Michael Arbib Bernard Baars John S. Bell Charles Bennett Margaret Boden David Bohm Neils Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann Emile Borel Max Born Leon Brillouin Stephen Brush Henry Thomas Buckle Donald Campbell Anthony Cashmore Eric Chaisson Jean-Pierre Changeux Arthur Holly Compton John Conway E. H. Culverwell Charles Darwin Abraham de Moivre Paul Dirac John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Paul Ehrenfest Albert Einstein Richard Feynman Joseph Fourier Michael Gazzaniga GianCarlo Ghirardi Nicolas Gisin Thomas Gold A.O.Gomes Joshua Greene Jacques Hadamard Patrick Haggard Augustin Hamon Sam Harris Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg William Stanley Jevons Pascual Jordan Simon Kochen Stephen Kosslyn Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé Pierre-Simon Laplace David Layzer Benjamin Libet Josef Loschmidt Ernst Mach Henry Margenau James Clerk Maxwell Ernst Mayr Jacques Monod Roger Penrose Steven Pinker Max Planck Henri Poincaré Adolphe Quételet Jerome Rothstein Erwin Schrödinger Claude Shannon Herbert Simon Dean Keith Simonton B. F. Skinner Henry Stapp Antoine Suarez Leo Szilard William Thomson (Kelvin) John von Neumann Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wilson Ernst Zermelo |
Scientists
Michael Arbib John S. Bell Bernard Baars Charles Bennett Margaret Boden David Bohm Neils Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann Emile Borel Max Born Leon Brillouin Stephen Brush Henry Thomas Buckle Donald Campbell Anthony Cashmore Eric Chaisson Jean-Pierre Changeux Arthur Holly Compton John Conway E. H. Culverwell Charles Darwin Abraham de Moivre Paul Dirac John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Paul Ehrenfest Albert Einstein Richard Feynman Joseph Fourier Michael Gazzaniga GianCarlo Ghirardi Nicolas Gisin A.O.Gomes Joshua Greene Jacques Hadamard Patrick Haggard Sam Harris Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg William Stanley Jevons Pascual Jordan Simon Kochen Stephen Kosslyn Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé Pierre-Simon Laplace David Layzer Benjamin Libet Josef Loschmidt Ernst Mach Henry Margenau James Clerk Maxwell Ernst Mayr Jacques Monod Roger Penrose Steven Pinker Max Planck Henri Poincaré Adolphe Quételet Jerome Rothstein Erwin Schrödinger Claude Shannon Herbert Simon Dean Keith Simonton B. F. Skinner Henry Stapp Antoine Suarez Leo Szilard William Thomson (Kelvin) John von Neumann Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wilson Ernst Zermelo Rolf Landauer
Rolf Landauer extended the ideas of John von Neumann and Leo Szilard, who, along with many other physicists, had connected a physical measurement with thermodynamical irreversibility, that is to say a dissipation of energy and increase in entropy.
The increase in entropy (or decrease in available negentropy, as Leon Brillouin put it), must equal or exceed the increase in information acquired in the measurement, in order to satisfy the second law of thermodynamics.
Landauer studied the special case of digital computers which read and write information as part of their calculations, but have extremely small or even zero energy dissipation, especially in computations that are in principle logically reversible. Such calculations must include their input values along with their outputs, in order to allow the computer to step backward through the calculation and restore the original state.
Some of Landauer's thinking assumes completely deterministic classical mechanics, in which trajectories are a known function of the forces and initial conditions. This is of course an idealization not realizable in the physical world, but can be approximated by large classical objects such as billiard balls (cf., the digital physics of Ed Fredkin).
Since the introduction of quantum mechanics and the realization that we live in a universe with irreducible background noise (the cosmic microwave background radiation with a temperasture of about 3°K), noise and entropy-free deterministic systems are the idealizations of mathematicians, philosophers, and computer scientists.
Indeed, a major difference between Bell Labs and IBM can perhaps be seen in the observation that Bell Labs has learned to communicate signals in the presence of noise and discovered the ultimate cosmic source of entropic noise, where IBM has excelled at eliminating the effects of noise from our best computers. At Bell Labs, Claude Shannon developed information theory, with its fundamental connection to Ludwig Boltzmann's entropy. And there Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson discovered the cosmic background radiation. At IBM, Landauer and his colleague Charles Bennett are famous for logically and thermodynamically reversible computing, which ignores the effects of noise and entropy until the computer bits of information must be erased (Landauer's Principle).
Logically irreversible devices do not remember the inputs. They are thus one-way processes that lose information. Logically irreversible devices are necessary to computing, says Landauer, and logical irreversibility implies physical irreversibility.
We shall call a device logically irreversible if the output of a device does not uniquely define the inputs. We believe that devices exhibiting logical irreversibility are essential to computing. Logical irreversibility, we believe, in turn implies physical irreversibility, and the latter is accompanied by dissipative effects.Landauer then goes on to describe classes of computers that can be considered logically reversible. They must not only save their inputs, but also the results of all intermediate logical steps, to provide the necessary information to perform all the steps backwards and restore the original conditions. In particular, he says, no information can be erased. That the entropy must go up on erasure is known as Landauer's Principle. Landauer's colleague at IBM, Charles Bennett, carries on the investigations of logically reversible computing. Landauer describes two examples of logically reversible machines. [The first is] a particular class of computers, namely those using logical functions of only one or two variables. After a machine cycle each of our N binary elements is a function of the state of at most two of the binary elements before the machine cycle. Now assume that the computer is logically reversible. Then the machine cycle maps the 2N possible initial states of the machine onto the same space of 2N states, rather than just a subspace thereof. In the 2N possible states each bit has a ONE and a ZERO appearing with equal frequency. Hence the reversible computer can utilize only those truth functions whose truth table exhibits equal numbers of ONES and ZEROS. The admissible truth functions then are the identity and negation, the EXCLUSIVE OR and its negation. These, however, are not a complete set' and do not permit a synthesis of all other truth functions. [Landauer also describes] more general devices. Consider, for example, a particular three-input, three-output device, i.e., a small special purpose computer with three bit positions. Let p, q, and r be the variables before the machine cycle. The particular truth function under consideration is the one which replaces r by p • q if r = 0, and replaces r by NOT p • q if r = 1. The variables p and q are left unchanged during the machine cycle. We can consider r as giving us a choice of program, and p, q as the variables on which the selected program operates. This is a logically reversible device, its output always defines its input uniquely. Nevertheless it is capable of performing an operation such as AND which is not, in itself, reversible. The computer, however, saves enough of the input information so that it supplements the desired result to allow reversibility. It is interesting to note, however, that we did not "save" the program; we can only deduce what it was. Now consider a more general purpose computer, which usually has to go through many machine cycles to carry out a program. At first sight it may seem that logical reversibility is simply obtained by saving the input in some corner of the machine. We shall, however, label a machine as being logically reversible, if and only if all its individual steps are logically reversible. This means that every single time a truth function of two variables is evaluated we must save some additional information about the quantities being operated on, whether we need it or not. Erasure, which is equivalent to RESTORE TO ONE. discussed in the Introduction, is not permitted. We will, therefore, in a long program clutter up our machine bit positions with unnecessary information about intermediate results. Furthermore if we wish to use the reversible function of three variables, which was just discussed. as an AND, then we must supply in the initial programming a separate ZERO for every AND operation which is subsequently required, since the "bias" which programs the device is not saved, when the AND is performed. The machine must therefore have a great deal of extra capacity to store both the extra "bias" bits and the extra outputs. Can it be given adequate capacity to make all intermediate steps reversible? If our machine is capable, as machines are generally understood to be, of a non-terminating program, then it is clear that the capacity for preserving all the information about all the intermediate steps cannot be there. Let us, however, not take such an easy way out. Perhaps it is just possible to devise a machine, useful in the normal sense, but not capable of embarking on a nonterminating program. Let us take such a machine as it normally comes, involving logically irreversible truth functions. An irreversible truth function can be made into a reversible one, as we have illustrated, by "embedding" it in a truth function of a large number of variables. The larger truth function, however, requires extra inputs to bias it, and extra outputs to hold the information which provides the reversibility. What we now contend is that this larger machine, while it is reversible, is not a useful computing machine in the normally accepted sense of the word. First of all, in order to provide space for the extra inputs and outputs, the embedding requires knowledge of the number of times each of the operations of the original (irreversible) machine will be required. The usefulness of a computer stems, however, from the fact that it is more than just a table look-up device; it can do many programs which were not anticipated in full detail by the designer. Our enlarged machine must have a number of bit positions, for every embedded device of the order of the number of program steps and requires a number of switching events during program loading comparable to the number that occur during the program itself. The setting of bias during program loading, which would typically consist of restoring a long row of bits to say ZERO, is just the type of nonreversible logical operation we are trying to avoid. Our unwieldy machine has therefore avoided the irreversible operations during the running of the program, only at the expense of added comparable irreversibility during the loading of the program. For Teachers
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