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Philosophers

Mortimer Adler
Rogers Albritton
Alexander of Aphrodisias
G.E.M.Anscombe
Anselm
Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
David Armstrong
Augustine
J.L.Austin
A.J.Ayer
Alexander Bain
Mark Balaguer
William Belsham
Henri Bergson
Isaiah Berlin
Bernard Berofsky
Susanne Bobzien
Emil du Bois-Reymond
George Boole
Émile Boutroux
F.H.Bradley
C.D.Broad
C.A.Campbell
Joseph Keim Campbell
Carneades
Ernst Cassirer
Roderick Chisholm
Chrysippus
Cicero
Randolph Clarke
Samuel Clarke
Anthony Collins
Diodorus Cronus
Donald Davidson
Democritus
Daniel Dennett
René Descartes
Richard Double
Fred Dretske
John Earman
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Epictetus
Epicurus
Herbert Feigl
John Martin Fischer
Owen Flanagan
Luciano Floridi
Philippa Foot
Alfred Fouilleé
Harry Frankfurt
Richard L. Franklin
Michael Frede
Carl Ginet
Nicholas St. John Green
H.Paul Grice
Ian Hacking
Ishtiyaque Haji
Stuart Hampshire
W.F.R.Hardie
R.M.Hare
Georg W.F. Hegel
Martin Heidegger
R.E.Hobart
Thomas Hobbes
David Hodgson
Shadsworth Hodgson
Ted Honderich
Pamela Huby
David Hume
Ferenc Huoranszki
William James
Lord Kames
Robert Kane
Immanuel Kant
Tomis Kapitan
William King
Christine Korsgaard
Keith Lehrer
Gottfried Leibniz
Leucippus
Michael Levin
C.I.Lewis
David Lewis
Peter Lipton
John Locke
Michael Lockwood
John R. Lucas
Lucretius
James Martineau
Hugh McCann
Colin McGinn
Michael McKenna
Paul E. Meehl
Alfred Mele
John Stuart Mill
Dickinson Miller
G.E.Moore
Thomas Nagel
Friedrich Nietzsche
P.H.Nowell-Smith
Robert Nozick
William of Ockham
Timothy O'Connor
David F. Pears
Charles Sanders Peirce
Derk Pereboom
Steven Pinker
Plato
Karl Popper
H.A.Prichard
Hilary Putnam
Willard van Orman Quine
Frank Ramsey
Ayn Rand
Thomas Reid
Charles Renouvier
Nicholas Rescher
C.W.Rietdijk
Josiah Royce
Bertrand Russell
Paul Russell
Gilbert Ryle
T.M.Scanlon
Moritz Schlick
Arthur Schopenhauer
John Searle
Wilfrid Sellars
Henry Sidgwick
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
J.J.C.Smart
Saul Smilansky
Michael Smith
L. Susan Stebbing
George F. Stout
Galen Strawson
Peter Strawson
Eleonore Stump
Richard Taylor
Kevin Timpe
Peter van Inwagen
Manuel Vargas
John Venn
Kadri Vihvelin
Voltaire
G.H. von Wright
David Foster Wallace
R. Jay Wallace
W.G.Ward
Ted Warfield
Roy Weatherford
Alfred North Whitehead
David Widerker
David Wiggins
Bernard Williams
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Susan Wolf

Scientists

Michael Arbib
Bernard Baars
John S. Bell
Charles Bennett
Margaret Boden
David Bohm
Neils Bohr
Ludwig Boltzmann
Emile Borel
Max Born
Leon Brillouin
Stephen Brush
Henry Thomas Buckle
Donald Campbell
Anthony Cashmore
Eric Chaisson
Jean-Pierre Changeux
Arthur Holly Compton
John Conway
E. H. Culverwell
Charles Darwin
Abraham de Moivre
Paul Dirac
John Eccles
Arthur Stanley Eddington
Paul Ehrenfest
Albert Einstein
Richard Feynman
Joseph Fourier
Michael Gazzaniga
GianCarlo Ghirardi
Nicolas Gisin
Thomas Gold
A.O.Gomes
Joshua Greene
Jacques Hadamard
Patrick Haggard
Augustin Hamon
Sam Harris
Martin Heisenberg
Werner Heisenberg
William Stanley Jevons
Pascual Jordan
Simon Kochen
Stephen Kosslyn
Rolf Landauer
Alfred Landé
Pierre-Simon Laplace
David Layzer
Benjamin Libet
Josef Loschmidt
Ernst Mach
Henry Margenau
James Clerk Maxwell
Ernst Mayr
Jacques Monod
Roger Penrose
Steven Pinker
Max Planck
Henri Poincaré
Adolphe Quételet
Jerome Rothstein
Erwin Schrödinger
Claude Shannon
Herbert Simon
Dean Keith Simonton
B. F. Skinner
Henry Stapp
Antoine Suarez
Leo Szilard
William Thomson (Kelvin)
John von Neumann
Daniel Wegner
Steven Weinberg
Norbert Wiener
Eugene Wigner
E. O. Wilson
Ernst Zermelo
 
Jacques Hadamard
Jacques Hadamard was a great mathematician who studied his thought processes in solving mathematical problems. He interviewed many other leading mathematicians and scientists, including Henri Poincaré, many of whom shared Hadamard's experience that solutions to problems often came suddenly and completely, generally after long reflections on the problem.

In his 1945 book Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field, Hadamard described the Synthèse conference in Paris in 1936 to study creativity. In Chapter III, Hadamard described how the combination of random ideas could lead to a choice of the best combination. Chance alone is not enough.

Combination of Ideas. What we just observed concerning the unconscious in general will be seen again from another angle, when speaking of its relations with discovery. We shall see a little later that the possibility of imputing discovery to pure chance is already excluded by Poincaré's observations, when more attentively considered.

On the contrary, that there is an intervention of chance but also a necessary work of unconsciousness, the latter implying and not contradicting the former, appears, as Poincaré shows, when we take account not merely of the results of introspection, but of the very nature of the question.

Indeed, it is obvious that invention or discovery, be it in mathematics or anywhere else, takes place by combining ideas.1 Now, there is an extremely great number of such combinations, most of which are devoid of interest, while, on the contrary, very few of them can be fruitful. Which ones does our mind — I mean our conscious mind — perceive? Only the fruitful ones, or exceptionally, some which could be fruitful.

However, to find these, it has been necessary to construct the very numerous possible combinations, among which the useful ones are to be found.

It cannot be avoided that this first operation take place, to a certain extent, at random, so that the role of chance is hardly doubtful in this first step of the mental process. But we see that that intervention of chance occurs inside the unconscious: for most of these combinations — more exactly, all those which are useless — remain unknown to us.

Moreover, this shows us again the manifold character of the unconscious, which is necessary to construct those numerous combinations and to compare them with each other.

The Following Step. It is obvious that this first process, this building up of numerous combinations, is only the beginning of creation, even, as we should say, preliminary to it. As we just saw, and as Poincaré observes, to create consists precisely in not making useless combinations and in examining only those which are useful and which are only a small minority. Invention is discernment, choice.

To Invent Is to Choose. This very remarkable conclusion appears the more striking if we compare it with what Paul Valéry writes in the Nouvelle Revue Française: "It takes two to invent anything. The one makes up combinations; the other one chooses, recognizes what he wishes and what is important to him in the mass of the things which the former has imparted to him.

"What we call genius is much less the work of the first one than the readiness of the second one to grasp the value of what has been laid before him and to choose it."

We see how beautifully the mathematician and the poet agree in that fundamental view of invention consisting of a choice.

Esthetics in Invention. How can such a choice be made? The rules which must guide it "are extremely fine and delicate. It is almost impossible to state them precisely; they are felt rather than formulated. Under these conditions, how can we imagine a sieve capable of applying them mechanically?"

Though we do not directly see this sieve at work, we can answer the question, because we are aware of the results it affords, i.e., the combinations of ideas which are perceived by our conscious mind. This result is not doubtful. "The privileged unconscious phenomena, those susceptible of becoming conscious, are those which, directly or indirectly, affect most profoundly our emotional sensibility.

"It may be surprising to see emotional sensibility invoked à propos of mathematical demonstrations which, it would seem, can interest only the intellect. This would be to forget the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers and forms, of geometric elegance. This is a true esthetic feeling that all real mathematicians know, and surely it belongs to emotional sensibility."

That an affective element is an essential part in every discovery or invention is only too evident, and has been insisted upon by several thinkers; indeed, it is clear that no significant discovery or invention can take place without the will of finding. But with Poincaré, we see something else, the intervention of the sense of beauty playing its part as an indispensable means of finding. We have reached the double conclusion:

that invention is choice
that this choice is imperatively governed by the sense of scientific beauty.

Hadamard desribed Poincaré as the source of the basic idea, but he credited Paul Valéry with the idea that there are two stages in creativity, perhaps even two entities - one to generate random alternative_possibilities, and the other to select or choose the best alternative.

These suggestions of Hadamard's were a major influence on Daniel Dennett's 1978 two-stages model of decision making which he called "Valerian."

Hadamard quoted Mozart to show that the first stage involves ideas that just "come to us" freely.

When I feel well and in a good humour, or when I am taking a drive or walking after a good meal, or in the night when I cannot sleep, thoughts crowd into my mind as easily as you could wish. Whence and how do they come? I do not know and I have nothing to do with it. Those which please me I keep in my head and hum them; at least others have told me that I do so....Then my soul is on fire with inspiration.
Hadamard and Poincaré both describe ideas that "present themselves" as William James described it.

Hadamard and Irreversibility
In 1906 Hadamard wrote a review of Josiah Willard Gibbs' Elementary Principles of Statistical Mechanics. (Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 12, p.194-210) He called it pure mathematics, applying the calculus of probabilities (of Laplace and others) to mechanics.

He wrote:

It remains to address the most important and most delicate that raises the study of the distribution phase. What happens to this distribution in the course of the movement, when part of any state: it tends, for example, to move closer to the canonical distribution or any distribution with similar properties?

This is, in short, the vital issue for kinetic theories. The paradox related and which seems at first to determine in advance any theory of this kind is as follows. How can the equations of dynamics, which are all reversible, lead to irreversible laws, to the growth of entropy? (p.201)

[Il reste à traiter la question la plus importante et la plus délicate que soulève cette étude de la distribution en phase. Que devient cette distribution au cours du mouvement, lorsqu'on part d'un état quelconque: tend-elle, par exemple, à se rapprocher de la distribution canonique ou d'une distribution présentant des propriétés analogues?

C'est, en somme, la question vitale pour les théories cinétiques. Le paradoxe qui s'y rattache et qui semble, au premier abord, miner par avance toute théorie de cette nature est eu effet le suivant. Comment, eu partant d'équations de la dynamique, toutes réversibles, parviendra-t-on à des lois irréversibles, à la croissance de l'entropie?]

We develop an answer in our treatment of micro-reversibility.

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