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Core Concepts
Adequate Determinism Agent-Causality Alternative Possibilities Causa Sui Causality Certainty Chance Chance Not Direct Cause The Cogito Model Compatibilism Comprehensive Compatibilism Conceptual Analysis Control Could Do Otherwise Creativity Default Responsibility De-liberation Determination Determination Fallacy Determinism Disambiguation Either Way Ethical Fallacy Experimental Philosophy Extreme Libertarianism Event Has Many Causes Frankfurt Cases Free Choice Freedom of Action "Free Will" Free Will Axiom Free Will in Antiquity Free Will Mechanisms Free Will Requirements Free Will Theorem Future Contingency Hard Incompatibilism Illusion of Determinism Illusionism Impossibilism Incompatibilism Indeterminacy Indeterminism Infinities Laplace's Demon Libertarianism Liberty of Indifference Libet Experiments Luck Master Argument Modest Libertarianism Moral Necessity Moral Responsibility Moral Sentiments Mysteries Naturalism Necessity Noise Non-Causality Nonlocality Origination Paradigm Case Pre-determinism Predictability Probability Pseudo-Problem Random When?/Where? Rational Fallacy Responsibility Same Circumstances Scandal Science Advance Fallacy Second Thoughts Semicompatibilism Separability Soft Causality Special Relativity Standard Argument Taxonomy Temporal Sequence Tertium Quid Torn Decision Two-Stage Models Ultimate Responsibility Uncertainty Up To Us Voluntarism Philosophers Mortimer Adler Rogers Albritton Alexander of Aphrodisias G.E.M.Anscombe Anselm Thomas Aquinas Aristotle David Armstrong Augustine J.L.Austin A.J.Ayer Alexander Bain Mark Balaguer William Belsham Henri Bergson Isaiah Berlin Bernard Berofsky Susanne Bobzien George Boole Émile Boutroux F.H.Bradley C.D.Broad C.A.Campbell Joseph Keim Campbell Carneades Ernst Cassirer Roderick Chisholm Chrysippus Cicero Randolph Clarke Samuel Clarke Anthony Collins Diodorus Cronus Donald Davidson Democritus Daniel Dennett René Descartes Richard Double Emil du Bois-Reymond Fred Dretske John Earman Laura Waddell Ekstrom Epictetus Epicurus Herbert Feigl John Martin Fischer Owen Flanagan Luciano Floridi Philippa Foot Alfred Fouillée Harry Frankfurt Richard L. Franklin Michael Frede Carl Ginet H.Paul Grice Nicholas St. John Green Ian Hacking Ishtiyaque Haji Stuart Hampshire W.F.R.Hardie R.M.Hare Georg W.F. Hegel Martin Heidegger R.E.Hobart Thomas Hobbes David Hodgson Shadsworth Hodgson Ted Honderich Pamela Huby David Hume Ferenc Huoranszki William James Lord Kames Robert Kane Immanuel Kant Tomis Kapitan William King Christine Korsgaard Keith Lehrer Gottfried Leibniz Leucippus Michael Levin C.I.Lewis David Lewis Peter Lipton John Locke Michael Lockwood John R. Lucas Lucretius James Martineau Hugh McCann Colin McGinn Michael McKenna Paul E. Meehl Alfred Mele John Stuart Mill Dickinson Miller G.E.Moore Thomas Nagel Friedrich Nietzsche P.H.Nowell-Smith Robert Nozick William of Ockham Timothy O'Connor David F. Pears Charles Sanders Peirce Derk Pereboom Steven Pinker Karl Popper H.A.Prichard Hilary Putnam Willard van Orman Quine Frank Ramsey Ayn Rand Thomas Reid Charles Renouvier Nicholas Rescher C.W.Rietdijk Josiah Royce Bertrand Russell Paul Russell Gilbert Ryle T.M.Scanlon Moritz Schlick Arthur Schopenhauer John Searle Wilfrid Sellars Henry Sidgwick Walter Sinnott-Armstrong J.J.C.Smart Saul Smilansky Michael Smith L. Susan Stebbing George F. Stout Galen Strawson Peter Strawson Eleonore Stump Richard Taylor Kevin Timpe Peter van Inwagen Manuel Vargas John Venn Kadri Vihvelin Voltaire G.H. von Wright David Foster Wallace R. Jay Wallace W.G.Ward Ted Warfield Roy Weatherford Alfred North Whitehead David Widerker David Wiggins Bernard Williams Ludwig Wittgenstein Susan Wolf Scientists Michael Arbib Bernard Baars John S. Bell Charles Bennett Margaret Boden David Bohm Neils Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann Emile Borel Max Born Stephen Brush Leon Brillouin Thomas Buckle Donald Campbell Anthony Cashmore Eric Chaisson Jean-Pierre Changeux Arthur Holly Compton John Conway E. H. Culverwell Charles Darwin Abraham de Moivre Paul Dirac John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Albert Einstein Paul Ehrenfest Richard Feynman Michael Gazzaniga GianCarlo Ghirardi Nicolas Gisin Thomas Gold A.O.Gomes Joshua Greene Jacques Hadamard Patrick Haggard Augustin Hamon Sam Harris Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg William Stanley Jevons Pascual Jordan Simon Kochen Stephen Kosslyn Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé Pierre-Simon Laplace David Layzer Benjamin Libet Josef Loschmidt Ernst Mach Henry Margenau James Clerk Maxwell Ernst Mayr Jacques Monod Roger Penrose Steven Pinker Max Planck Henri Poincaré Adolphe Quételet Jerome Rothstein Erwin Schrödinger Claude Shannon Dean Keith Simonton Herbert Simon B. F. Skinner Henry Stapp Antoine Suarez Leo Szilard William Thomson (Kelvin) John von Neumann Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wilson Ernst Zermelo |
The Pseudo-Problem of Free Will
The Pseudo-Problem of Free Will is a misnomer. Free Will is a real problem.
Free will was declared a pseudo-problem by Moritz Schlick in his 1936 essay The Pseudo-Problem of Freedom of the Will.
Ludwig Wittgenstein had convinced Schlick and his Vienna Circle of logical positivists/empiricists that philosophical problems could not be solved, only dis-solved, by careful attention to the use of language.
In C. A. Campbell's inaugural address at Glasgow University in 1938, In Defence of Free Will, he attempted to restore sensible discussion to a problem he regarded as unparalleled in the history of metaphysics. Later he attacked Schlick directly in his 1951 Mind article Is Free Will A Pseudo-Problem?
More likely to be Pseudo-Problems are Determinism, which is a dogma, Compatibilism, which is mostly sophistical word play to deny common sense, and Incompatibilism, which simultaneously refers to two opposing ideas - "Hard Determinism" and "Free Will."
Is it any wonder that such confused and abused language has resulted in the muddle of philosophizing on free will?
Determinism has always been more a matter of faith than an empirically established truth about the world or human beings. There is no scientific evidence for the strict determinism of philosophy. It is merely a dogma.
And the non-intuitive claim, thought true only by cerebral philosophers and brain-washed students of philosophy, that freedom is compatible with determinism is a black mark on the academy. It is the product of logicians who think the tortoise beats the hare and the ass starves to death if equidistant between two piles of hay. To be sure, what compatibilists may want and see correctly is that free will requires a degree of determination.
R.E.Hobart had part of the idea in his essay Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It.
Hobart's argument is similar to John Locke's simple insight that The Will Is Not Free, it is The Man Who Is Free. The Will is an Act of Determination.
Locke says in Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXI,Section 21 Of Power
"To return, then, to the inquiry about liberty, I think the question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free."And Locke knew that language like "free will is incompatible with determinism" was itself the source of philosophical errors. "This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as I guess, produced great confusion."
Peter van Inwagen had another part of the idea in his Essay on Free Will when he found Incompatibilism to be true but could not see the proper place for Indeterminism.
An improved, new, or strong Compatibilism might be:
Free Will is Compatible with both "Adequate" Determinism and Indeterminism
Resolution of the Pseudo-Problem of Determinism
The very simple answer is to recognize the term "free will" as a complex of two independent concepts, free and will, arranged in a temporal sequence.
The Free in Free Will isCompatible with (Some) IndeterminismThe Will in Free Will is
The Free in Free Will Creates and Liberates Alternative Possibilities
The Will in Free Will De-Liberates and Determines
the one Possibility among many
that is to become Actuality
Chance, in a present time of random alternatives, allows the Mind a Choice which selects one possibility and transforms an equivocal and open future into an unalterable and closed past.
The Will Is Not Free (per se), as John Locke first pointed out. It is the Mind that is Free.
Free and Will combine to describe the Mind's ability:
Philosophers appear to be logical monists with respect to determinism. Either "Determinism is true" they say or "Determinism is false," In which case, they lament, "Indeterminism is true," which many otherwise sensible thinkers take, in a most simple-minded way, to mean that everything is random, that that every event has no cause, that chance is the direct cause of our actions, and that absolute chance rules the world.
Here is P. H. Nowell Smith
The fallacy of [Incompatibilism] has often been exposed and the clearest proof that it is mistaken or at least muddled lies in showing that I could not be free to choose what I do unless determinism is correct. For the simplest actions could not be performed in an indeterministic universe. If I decide, say, to eat a piece of fish, I cannot do so if the fish is liable to turn into a stone or to disintegrate in mid-air or to behave in any other utterly unpredictable manner.
Origin of the Concept and the Term - Pseudo-Problem
Ludwig Wittgenstein was fond of quoting the introduction to Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics, which traced many problems to confusion in language. Such problems were not really soluble, but could be eliminated by clarifying the language. Wittgenstein's biographer, Ray Monk, says this was the origin of his concept of dis-solving problems.
In The Principles of Mechanics Hertz had proposed that, instead of giving a direct answer to the question: 'What is force?' the problem should be dealt with by restating Newtonian physics without using `force' as a basic concept. Throughout his life, Wittgenstein regarded Hertz's solution to the problem as a perfect model of how philosophical confusion should be dispelled, and frequently cited – as a statement of his own aim in philosophy – the following sentence from Hertz's introduction to The Principles of Mechanics:When these painful contradictions are removed, the question as to the nature of force will not have been answered; but our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate questions.In a conscious echo of this sentence, Wittgenstein wrote:In my way of doing philosophy, its whole aim is to give an expression such a form that certain disquietudes disappear. (Hertz). [Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, p.446]
Wittgenstein used many pseudo-terms in the Tractatus - pseudo-concept, pseudo-relation, and most importantly pseudo-proposition. But he does not use pseudo-problem.
Recall that Russell and Whitehead had defined knowledge of the world as a set of true propositions. We still find this definition in recent works of analytic philosophers. Here is Wittgenstein in the Tractatus.
4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences). 4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. For Teachers
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