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Core Concepts

Adequate Determinism
Alternative Possibilities
Causa sui
Causality
Certainty
Chance
Chance Not Direct Cause
The Cogito Model
Compatibilism
Conceptual Analysis
Control
Could Do Otherwise
Creativity
De-liberation
Determinism
Disambiguation
Ethical Fallacy
"Free Will"
Free Will Mechanisms
Free Will Requirements
Future Contingency
Hard Incompatibilism
Illusionism
Impossibilism
Incompatibilism
Indeterminacy
Indeterminism
Libertarianism
Liberty of Indifference
Luck
Moral Responsibility
Moral Sentiments
Naturalism
Necessity
Predictability
Probability
Pseudo-Problem
Random When?/Where?
Rational Fallacy
Responsibility
Same Circumstances
Second Thoughts
Semicompatibilism
Soft Causality
Standard Argument
Temporal Sequence
Two-Stage Models
Uncertainty
Up To Us

Philosophers

Mortimer Adler
G.E.M.Anscombe
Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
Augustine
A.J.Ayer
Mark Balaguer
Isaiah Berlin
Susanne Bobzien
George Boole
F.H.Bradley
C.D.Broad
C.A.Campbell
Joseph Keim Campbell
Ernst Cassirer
Roderick Chisholm
Chrysippus
Cicero
Randolph Clarke
Donald Davidson
Democritus
Daniel Dennett
René Descartes
Richard Double
John Earman
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Epictetus
Epicurus
John Martin Fischer
Philippa Foot
Alfred Fouilleé
Harry Frankfurt
Richard L. Franklin
Carl Ginet
Ian Hacking
Ishtiyaque Haji
Stuart Hampshire
Georg W.F. Hegel
Martin Heidegger
R.E.Hobart
Thomas Hobbes
David Hodgson
Shadsworth Hodgson
Ted Honderich
David Hume
William James
Robert Kane
Tomis Kapitan
Immanuel Kant
Keith Lehrer
Gottfried Leibniz
David Lewis
John Locke
John R. Lucas
Lucretius
Hugh McCann
Colin McGinn
Michael McKenna
Alfred Mele
John Stuart Mill
Dickinson Miller
G.E.Moore
Thomas Nagel
Friedrich Nietzsche
P.H.Nowell-Smith
Robert Nozick
William of Ockham
Timothy O'Connor
Charles Sanders Peirce
Derk Pereboom
Steven Pinker
Karl Popper
Willard van Orman Quine
Ayn Rand
Thomas Reid
Charles Renouvier
Josiah Royce
Bertrand Russell
Paul Russell
Gilbert Ryle
Moritz Schlick
Arthur Schopenhauer
John Searle
Henry Sidgwick
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
J.J.C.Smart
Saul Smilansky
Galen Strawson
Peter Strawson
Eleonore Stump
Richard Taylor
Kevin Timpe
Peter van Inwagen
Manuel Vargas
John Venn
Kadri Vihvelin
G.H. von Wright
R. Jay Wallace
Ted Warfield
Roy Weatherford
Alfred North Whitehead
David Widerker
David Wiggins
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Susan Wolf

Scientists

Neils Bohr
Ludwig Boltzmann
Max Born
Stephen Brush
Arthur Holly Compton
Abraham de Moivre
John Eccles
Arthur Stanley Eddington
Albert Einstein
Richard Feynman
A.O.Gomes
Joshua Greene
Martin Heisenberg
Werner Heisenberg
Pierre-Simon Laplace
David Layzer
Henry Margenau
James Clerk Maxwell
Steven Pinker
Max Planck
Henri Poincaré
Erwin Schrödinger
William Thomson (Kelvin)
John von Neumann
Daniel Wegner

 
Compatibilism
Compatibilists argue that determinism is compatible with human freedom, and that indeterminism is not compatible or at best incoherent. They feel (correctly) that there must be a deterministic or causal connection between our will and our actions. This allows us to take responsibility for our actions, including credit for the good and blame for the bad.
If the proximate cause of our actions was undetermined, the result of an uncaused quantum mechanical event in the mind, it would not be freedom of a kind worth having and we should disavow responsibility.
Most compatibilists accept the view of a causal chain of events going back indefinitely in time, consistent with the laws of nature, with the plan of an omniscient God, or with other determinisms. As long as our own will is included in that causal chain, we are free, they say. And they think causality in nature is related to the very possibility of reason and logic. Without causality, they say, we could not be certain of the truths of our arguments. These are dogmas of determinism.
We think compatibilists should be classified according to the particular determinisms they think are compatible with human freedom. It is one thing to claim compatibility with physics, another to claim compatibility with God's foreknowledge.
Some compatibilists, often reluctantly, accept the view that random quantum mechanical events occur in the world. Whether in the physical world, in the biological world (where they are a key driver of genetic mutations), or in the mind, randomness and uncaused events are real. Quantum events introduce the possibility of accidents, novelty, and human creativity. If compatibilists admit such indeterminism, they can probably be convinced of a stronger argument for human freedom.

See Giving Determinists What They Say They Want.

Our Cogito model assumes causality and adequate determinism in the critical apparatus of the Macro Mind. From the Micro Mind however, as well as from the external world including other minds, come surprising and unpredictable events to feed the Agenda of possible thoughts and actions. The Cogito is compatibile with both determinism and uncertainty. It lives in Eddington's "halfway house."
Compatibilism explains the will. It cannot explain free. Our new mind model gets us both free (random) and will (adequately determined). The Cogito is genuine free will.
For Teachers
Note there is also incompatibilism. There are two kinds of incompatibilists, those who deny human freedom (usually called "hard" determinists) and those who assert it (often called voluntarists, free willists, or metaphysical libertarians - to distinguish them from political libertarians).
For Scholars
The first compatibilist was Carneades (214-129), the great Skeptic.

Chapter 1.4 - Philosophy Chapter 2.2 - The History of Free Will
Part One - Introduction Part Three - Value
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