The Standard Argument has two parts.

First, it is claimed that determinism is the case, and thus the will is not free. We call this the Determinism Objection.

Second, if real chance existed, we could not be responsible for random actions. We call this the Randomness Objection.

Together, these objections can be combined in the Responsibility Objection, namely that no Free Will model has yet provided an intelligible account of the agent control needed for Moral Responsibility.

Both parts are logically and practically flawed, partly from abuse of language that led some philosophers to call free will a pseudo-problem, and partly from claims to knowledge that are based on faulty evidence. We shall show how to detect and correct the errors in both the reasoning and the evidence.

Determinism is true. All events are caused. All our actions are therefore caused. There is no free will.

Errors...

• Determinism is not true. Just consider part two of the standard argument below.

• Physical determinism is not "true" because physics is empirical, not logical, and quantum mechanical indeterminism is extremely well established.

• Some events are unpredictable from prior events. They are causa sui.

• Our actions are caused by an adequately determined will.

• But our will can choose from free alternative possibilities that are unpredictable.

• The will itself is indeed not free, but we are free.

Chance exists. If our actions are caused by chance, we can not call that free will because we could not be held morally responsible for random actions.

Errors...

• Randomness in some microscopic quantum events is indeed chance.

• But microscopic chance does little to affect adequate macroscopic determinism.

• Chance events only generate alternative possibilities. They are not the direct cause of actions.

• We are free, in control, and morally responsible for our choices and actions, because they are adequately determined.

Can you see the two standard objections and the flaws in reasoning or claims of truth that are based on faulty evidence?

The argument is exceedingly familiar, and runs as follows. Either determinism is true or it is not. If it is true, then all our chosen actions are uniquely necessitated by prior states of the world, just like every other event. But then it cannot be the case that we could have acted otherwise, since this would require a possibility determinism rules out. Once the initial conditions are set and the laws fixed, causality excludes genuine freedom.

On the other hand, if indeterminism is true, then, though things could have happened otherwise, it is not the case that we could have chosen otherwise, since a merely random event is no kind of free choice. That some events occur causelessly, or are not subject to law, or only to probabilistic law, is not sufficient for those events to be free choices.

Thus one horn of the dilemma represents choices as predetermined happenings in a predictable causal sequence, while the other construes them as inexplicable lurches to which the universe is randomly prone. Neither alternative supplies what the notion of free will requires, and no other alternative suggests itself. Therefore freedom is not possible in any kind of possible world. The concept contains the seeds of its own destruction.
(Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry, 1993, p.80)

The metaphysical problem of human freedom might be summarized in the following way: "Human beings are responsible agents; but this fact appears to conflict with a deterministic view of human action (the view that every event that is involved in an act is caused by some other event); and it also appears to conflict with an indeterministic view of human action (the view that the act, or some event. that is essential to the act, is not caused at all)." To solve the problem, I believe, we must make somewhat far-reaching assumptions about the self of the agent — about the man who performs the act.
(Freedom and Action, reprinted in Freedom and Determinism, ed. Keith Lehrer, 1966, p.11)

There are but these two alternatives. Either an action is causally determined. Or, to the extent that it is causally undetermined, its occurrence depends on chance. But chance alone does not constitute freedom. On its own chance comes to nothing more than randomness. And one thing does seem to be clear. Randomness, the operation of mere chance, clearly excludes control.
(Free Will: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, 2004, p. 16)

Here is an argument that I think is obvious (I don't mean it's obviously right; I mean it's one that should occur pretty quickly to any philosopher who asked himself what arguments could be found to support incompatibilism):

If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.

I shall call this argument the Consequence Argument.

[A variant argument] proceeds by identifying indeterminism with chance and by arguing that an act that occurs by chance, if an event that occurs by chance can be called an act, cannot be under the control of its alleged agent and hence cannot have been performed freely. Proponents of [this argument] conclude, therefore, that free will is not only compatible with determinism but entails determinism. (Essay on Free Will, 1983, p.16)

Let us now consider the libertarians, who claim that we have a capacity for indeterministically free action, and that we are thereby morally responsible. According to one libertarian view, what makes actions free is just their being constituted (partially) of indeterministic natural events. Lucretius, for example, maintains that actions are free just in virtue of being made up partially of random swerves in the downward paths of atoms. These swerves, and the actions they underlie, are random (at least) in the sense that they are not determined by any prior state of the universe.

If quantum theory is true, the position and momentum of micro-particles exhibit randomness in this same sense, and natural indeterminacy of this sort might also be conceived as the metaphysical foundation of indeterministically free action. But natural indeterminacies of these types cannot, by themselves, account for freedom of the sort required for moral responsibility.

As has often been pointed out, such random physical events are no more within our control than are causally determined physical events, and thus, we can no more be morally responsible for them than, in the indeterminist opinion, we can be for events that are causally determined. (Noûs 29, 1995, reprinted in Free Will, ed. D. Pereboom, 1997, p.252)

The most straightforward way to attack the standard argument is to see that the three objections really need to become three requirements for free will.

First, there is a Determinism Requirement - that our actions be determined by our character and values. This requires that any randomness not be the direct cause of our actions.

Next, there must be a Randomness Requirement, unpredictable events to break the causal chain of determinism that would make the causes of our actions simply the consequences of events in the remote past.

If we can meet these two requirements, we will satisfy the Responsibility Requirement.

We do this by showing

1. that the determinism we really have in the world is only adequate determinism and

2. that the randomness we have (especially quantum indeterminism) has negligible effect on that adequate determinism, but provides the alternative possibilities needed for our determined choice.

See the Cogito model for the details and many lesser requirements.