The problem of moral responsibility is intimately connected with the problem of free will
If our actions are causally determined by prior events, including a chain of events that goes back before we were born, libertarians
do not see how we can feel responsible for them.
If our actions are directly caused by chance
, they are simply random and determinists
do not see how we can feel responsibility for them.
But we do feel responsible.
Despite more than twenty-three centuries of philosophizing, most modern thinkers have not moved significantly beyond this core problem of randomness and free will - the mistaken idea
that free actions are caused directly by a random event
To be responsible for our actions, they must have been caused by something within us, they must "depend on us
" (the Greeks called this ἐφ ἡμῖν). Modern "agent-causal" theorists demand that something in the agent's mind - perhaps a uniquely mental substance - gives us the power to cause our actions.
In our Cogito
model, responsibility comes from an adequately determined
will choosing from among randomly generated alternative possibilities
We have identified a number of critical requirements
for our Cogito model of free will.
Some of these are requirements for freedom
. Others are requirements for an adequately determined will